Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion: Resisting Legislative Solution by Tovino, Stacey A.
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2007
Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion: Resisting
Legislative Solution
Stacey A. Tovino
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Health Law Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and the Psychology and
Psychiatry Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law. For more information, please contact
david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tovino, Stacey A., "Psychiatric Restraint and Seclusion: Resisting Legislative Solution" (2007). Scholarly Works. Paper 79.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/79
TOVINO FINAL 8/8/2007 11:12:33 AM 
 
511 
 
PSYCHIATRIC RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION: 
RESISTING LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION 
Stacey A. Tovino, J.D., Ph.D.∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The use of restraint1 and seclusion2 in the American 
psychiatric setting has a rich history—rich in medical, 
ethical, legal, and social controversy.3  For centuries, mental 
 
∗ Assistant Professor of Law, Health Law Institute, Hamline University School 
of Law.  I am grateful to Bill Winslade, Chester Burns, Marissa Gostanian, 
Julie Kutac, Krisann Muskievicz, Susan Night, Cindy Jesson, Michael 
Scherschligt, and Carol Swanson for their comments on earlier versions and 
presentations of this Article, Bill Winslade and Michael Scherschligt for their 
mentorship, Michael Bronson and Claire Duncan for their research assistance, 
and Regina Watson and Barb Kallusky at the Hamline Law Library for their 
assistance with locating primary sources. 
 1. Governmental and legal definitions of restraint vary.  The Government 
Accountability Office defines a restraint as a “partial or total immobilization of 
a person through the use of drugs, mechanical devices such as leather cuffs, or 
physical holding by another person.”  U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MENTAL 
HEALTH: IMPROPER RESTRAINT OR SECLUSION USE PLACES PEOPLE AT RISK, 
GAO/HEHS-99-176, at 1 n.1 (1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].  Federal 
regulations that apply to Medicare-participating hospitals define restraint as 
follows: 
Any manual method, physical or mechanical device, material, or 
equipment that immobilizes or reduces the ability of a patient to move 
his or her harms, legs, body, or head freely; or [a] drug or medication 
when it is used as a restriction to manage the patient’s behavior or 
restrict the patient’s freedom of movement and is not a standard 
treatment or dosage for the patient’s condition. 
42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(e)(1)(i)(A)-(B) (2007). 
 2. Federal regulations that apply to Medicare-participating hospitals 
define seclusion as the “involuntary confinement of a patient alone in a room or 
area from which the patient is physically prevented from leaving.”  42 C.F.R. § 
482.13(e)(1)(ii). 
 3. See, e.g., John Julian Allen, Seclusion and Restraint of Children: A 
Literature Review, 13 J. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 159, 159 
(2000) (“There is widespread concern and ethical debate about the use of these 
controversial, untested, and questionably effective interventions . . . .”); Nancy 
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health care providers used movement restrictions and solitary 
confinement to manage psychiatric patients.4  
Superintendents of eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
insane asylums and other institutions of confinement believed 
that strait-waistcoats, “tranquilizer chairs,” “maniac beds,” 
chains, shackles, and “quiet rooms” deescalated agitation and 
promoted self-control.5  Reforms beginning in the nineteenth 
century helped make some psychiatric institutions more 
 
S. Cotton, The Developmental-Clinical Rationale for the Use of Seclusion in the 
Psychiatric Treatment of Children, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 442, 442 (1989) 
(“Ethically, [seclusion] seems to run counter to our humanistic intuitions about 
. . . proper treatment . . . . Legally, it poses a serious challenge to the most basic 
tenets of our system, focused as it is on the protection of rights and freedom.  If 
the practice of seclusion is to be justified, one would expect that justification to 
come from clinicians, those who prescribe its implementation.  Yet even in this 
realm many are troubled; the practice of seclusion in our profession of seclusion 
seems to e an anomaly in our profession of care and protection.”); J. Carole 
Taxis, Ethics and Praxis: Alternative Strategies to Physical Restraint and 
Seclusion in a Psychiatric Setting, 23 ISSUES IN MENTAL HEALTH NURSING 157, 
158 (2002) (“An ethical quagmire often arises when the nurse, faced with a 
decision to seclude or restrain a patient, must balance factors of autonomy, 
beneficence, and nonmaleficence with therapeutic goals.” (citing ELISE 
BANDMAN & BERTRAM BANDMAN, NURSING ETHICS THROUGH THE LIFE SPAN 
(4th ed. 2001); TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF 
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (5th ed. 2001))). 
 4. See, e.g., David Macbride, A Methodical Introduction to the Theory and 
Practice of Physick, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS OF PSYCHIATRY, 1535-1860: A 
HISTORY PRESENTED IN SELECTED ENGLISH TEXTS 449, 449-50 fig. 90 (Richard 
Hunter & Ida Macalpine eds., 1963) [hereinafter THREE HUNDRED YEARS] 
(illustrating the straight-waistcoats and “maniac beds” used to restrain patients 
in eighteenth-century England). 
 5. John Haslam, Observations on Madness and Melancholy, in THREE 
HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 633, 635 (“In the most violent state of the 
disease, the patient should be kept alone in a dark and quiet room so that he 
may not be affected by the stimuli of light or sound, such abstraction more 
readily disposing to sleep.”); Macbride, supra note 4, at 449-50; Benjamin Rush, 
Medical Inquiries and Observations, Upon the Diseases of the Mind, in THREE 
HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 662, 668, 671 (illustrating Rush’s 
“tranquilizer” chair); Thomas Willis, Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of 
Brutes Which Is That of the Vital and Sensitive of Man, in THREE HUNDRED 
YEARS, supra note 4, at 188, 191 (“For by this means, the Corporeal Soul being 
in some measure depressed and restrained, is compell’d to remit its pride and 
fierceness; and so afterwards by degrees grows more mild, and returns in order: 
Wherefore, Furious Mad-men are sooner, and more certainly cured by 
punishments, and hard usage, in a strait room, than by Physick or Medicines.”).  
See generally Nancy Tomes, The Great Restraint Controversy: A Comparative 
Perspective on Anglo-American Psychiatry in the Nineteenth Century, in 3 THE 
ANATOMY OF MADNESS: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY 190, 202-03 
(Roy Porter et al. eds., 1988) (discussing the early American belief in the 
therapeutic use of restraints). 
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humane, in part because staff members were trained to find 
ways to calm potentially violent patients without imposing 
holds or isolation.6  With the advent of Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, advances in microbiology in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as well as the 
explosion of psychotropic drugs in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, many traditional uses of restraint and 
seclusion became unnecessary.7  Federal and state 
legislatures and administrative agencies responded to these 
philosophical, scientific, and medical developments by 
restricting restraint and seclusion to emergency situations 
and forbidding their imposition as a means of coercion, 
discipline, or convenience.8 
Although restraint and seclusion are used less frequently 
in the twenty-first century, they persist as methods of 
behavior management.9  A number of recent injuries and 
deaths associated with these interventions have refueled the 
 
 6. Cece Lentini, Fight Against Restraints Goes to Capitol Hill, KEY, Spring 
1999, at 1, 8 (“To be sure, reforms that began in the 19th century have helped 
make psychiatric institutions much more humane than they once were.  With 
appropriate training, staff members often can find ways to deescalate a 
potentially violent situation without using restraints at all.”); Philippe Pinel, A 
Treatise on Insanity, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 602, 606 
(examining mid-nineteenth century efforts to abandon coercive and repressive 
measures in insane asylums). 
 7. See generally FRANZ G. ALEXANDER & SHELDON T. SELESNICK, THE 
HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: AN EVALUATION OF PSYCHIATRIC THOUGHT AND 
PRACTICE FROM PREHISTORIC TIMES TO THE PRESENT 181-210, 271-96 (1966) 
(examining the impact of Freud, microbiology, and psychopharmacology on 
psychiatry). 
 8. See infra Parts IV.B-C. 
 9. See, e.g., Cal. Dep’t of Mental Health, Seclusion and Restraint Data: 
State Hospitals and Psychiatric Programs (Jan. 2007), 
http://www.dmh.cahwnet.gov/Statehospitals/S&R/default.asp (follow “S/R Data” 
hyperlink; then follow “Number of Seclusion Episodes” and “Number of 
Restraint Episodes” hyperlinks in “(Click on Image to Open Report)” column of 
“Seclusion and Restraints Data Charts” table) (documenting the occurrence of 
1546 restraint episodes and 541 seclusion episodes in California state mental 
hospitals and correctional facility psychiatric programs between January and 
March 2006); G. Kullgren et al., Practices and Attitudes Among Swedish 
Psychiatrists Regarding the Ethics of Compulsory Treatment, 16 MED. & L. 499, 
501-04 (1997) (examining the extent to which psychiatrists recommend 
compulsory interventions, including restraint and seclusion, in various clinical 
situations; finding that sixty-one percent of the respondents order restraint in 
cases of threatening and violent paranoid psychosis and that seventy-six 
percent of the respondents believed that physically restraining out-of-control 
patients is ethical). 
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dialogue regarding their appropriate use, bringing centuries-
old questions to the fore.10  Some stakeholders, who believe 
that the use of restraint and seclusion are evidence of patient 
warehousing, institutional abuse and neglect, and human 
rights violations, support legislation that would further 
reduce restraint and seclusion use or eliminate it altogether.11  
Other stakeholders, who believe that restraint and seclusion 
can be used to prevent violent or assaultive patients from 
harming themselves and others, are questioning the scientific 
basis, cost, and feasibility of restraint-and-seclusion-free 
initiatives.12  In recent legislative sessions, federal and state 
 
 10. See, e.g., Walter Goodman, Restraint as a Euphemism in Psychiatric 
Hospitals, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at E8 (reviewing a 60 Minutes II segment 
that covered the story of a sixteen-year-old boy who was asphyxiated by a towel 
while he was being “therapeutically restrained” at a for-profit psychiatric 
hospital); Hospital and Employees Cited in Death of Child, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 
1998, at B5 (reporting the death of an eleven-year-old boy who suffocated while 
being restrained at a Connecticut psychiatric facility); JOINT COMM’N ON 
ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS., THE JOINT COMMISSION’S SENTINEL 
EVENT DATABASE: 10 YEARS OF DIGGING AT THE ROOTS 3 (2005) (identifying 124 
deaths of restrained patients from data collected from 1995 to 2004); Tina 
Kelley, Center for Disabled Children Agrees to Improve Medical Care, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 2005, at B2 (discussing the 2002 death of fourteen-year-old 
Matthew Goodman after he was restrained at a center for developmentally 
disabled children); Encarnacion Pyle, Reformers Push to End Restraint, 
Seclusion; Death, Injuries Prompt Training of Workers in More Positive 
Methods, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2005, at A15 (reporting additional 
restraint and seclusion deaths); Heather Vogell, Safer Restraints in Group 
Homes? Proposed Rules Would Ban Workers from Sitting on Children, KATHI’S 
MENTAL HEALTH REV., Apr. 28, 2005, at 
http://www.toddlertime.com/advocacy/hospitals/restraints/restraints-051405-
2.htm (reporting the deaths of a twelve-year-old girl and a nine-year-old boy 
after mental health care workers laid on the children to restrain them). 
 11. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM DIRS., 
POSITION STATEMENT ON SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT (1999) [hereinafter 
POSITION STATEMENT] (“It is NASMHPD’s goal to prevent, reduce, and 
ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint . . . .”); SUBSTANCE 
ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., A NATIONAL CALL TO ACTION: ELIMINATING THE USE OF SECLUSION AND 
RESTRAINT 5 (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL CALL] (“It is now a priority for 
SAMHSA to . . . ultimately eliminate the use of seclusion and restraint. . . . 
Research shows that physical force, mobilization, and isolation are 
dehumanizing.  Seclusion and restraint . . . risk lives and inflict emotional and 
physical trauma.”); Janice LeBel & Kevin Ann Huckshorn, Elimination of 
Seclusion and Restraint: A Reasonable Goal?, 57 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 576, 577 
(2006) (“The assertion that seclusion and restraint can ultimately be eliminated 
. . . stands squarely on its own merits.”); cf. Akihito Suzuki, The Politics and 
Ideology of Non-Restraint: The Case of the Hanwell Asylum, 39 MED. HIST. 1 
(1995) (examining the non-restraint movement of Victorian psychiatry). 
 12. See, e.g., News Release, Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Guiding Principles on 
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lawmakers have attempted to respond to these seemingly 
irreconcilable concerns.13  Many commentators believe that 
heightened awareness of inappropriate restraint and 
seclusion practices and more intense education and 
regulation will resolve these concerns.14  I argue instead that 
 
Restraint and Seclusion for Behavioral Health Services, Feb. 29, 1999, at 
http://www.naphs.org/news/guidingprinc.html (arguing that “[r]estraint and 
seclusion, when used properly, can be life-saving and injury-sparing 
interventions,” and that overregulation of restraint and seclusion policies “could 
divert limited resources to bureaucratic activities” when such monies should be 
dedicated to clinical care); Andrés Martin et al., Letter to the Editor, Seclusion 
and Restraint “One-Hour Rule,” 43 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 1322, 1322 (2004) (stating that particular restraint and seclusion 
regulations “strain available human resources,” are “logistically burdensome,” 
and “may be of limited clinical utility”). 
 13. Compare Child and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006, S. 
3449, 109th Cong. § 110 (2006) (proposing the development and dissemination 
of educational materials that would encourage ending the use of restraint and 
seclusion in all facilities or programs that care for children and adolescents, as 
well as the training of mental health professionals and others on alternatives to 
restraint and seclusion), and 104 MASS. CODE REGS. 27.12(1) (2006) (requiring 
private, county, and municipal mental health facilities in Massachusetts to 
develop a plan to eliminate, wherever possible, the use of restraint and 
seclusion), and S.B. 325, 75th Leg., 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 698 (requiring state 
administrative agencies to adopt rules defining acceptable restraint holds, 
governing the use of seclusion, and developing methods for lowering the 
frequency of restraint and seclusion practices), with 70 Fed. Reg. 67,093, 67,093 
(Nov. 4, 2005) (clarifying that any authorized licensed health care professional 
may order the use of restraint and seclusion when necessary), and A. 9986, 
2006 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006) (proposing that New York physician assistants and 
nurse practitioners be permitted to order restraint), and S. 683, 2005 Leg., 
116th Sess. (S.C. 2005-2006) (proposing that South Carolina licensed 
independent practitioners be permitted to order restraint). 
 14. See, e.g., Joyce Jorgenson & Carol Geisler, Education Is Key to System-
Wide Change, NETWORKS, Summer/Fall 2002, at 9, 9 (“Education . . . is a 
cornerstone to changing the cultural environment that tolerates the practice of 
restraints and seclusion.”); NAT’L ASS’N OF PSYCHIATRIC HEALTH SYS., GUIDING 
PRINCIPLES ON RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES 
1 (1999) (recommending the sharing of guidelines and information on 
inappropriate restraint and seclusion techniques); Eric M. Weiss, Hundreds of 
the Nation’s Most Vulnerable Have Been Killed by the System Intended to Care 
for Them, HARTFORD COURANT (Conn.), Oct. 11, 1998, at A1, available at 
http://www.pcma.com/crisis_intervention_news/deadly_restraint/day1.stm (part 
of the newspaper’s five-part investigative series “Deadly Restraint: A 
Nationwide Pattern of Death,” published October 11-15, 1998) (“Yet the great 
tragedy is that many of the deaths could have been prevented by setting 
standards that are neither costly nor difficult: better training in restraint use; 
constant or frequent monitoring of patients in restraints; the banning of 
dangerous techniques such as face-down floor holds; CPR training for all direct-
care workers.”). 
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the psychiatric15 restraint and seclusion controversy16 resists 
legislative solution because it is a function of more 
fundamental problems relating to mental health care access 
and finance. The controversy persists because of these 
practical problems, and because the use of restraint and 
seclusion implicate seemingly competing goals of patient 
safety and individual autonomy and, more broadly, the 
philosophical doctrines of legalism and medicalism. 
Future restraint and seclusion policy must continue to 
address the significant dangers associated with these 
interventions by requiring the use of alternative de-escalation 
strategies, less restrictive measures consistent with patient 
and ward safety, and advanced monitoring of restrained and 
secluded patients.  Our health care policy also must address 
the root causes of restraint and seclusion use.  By providing 
earlier intervention and care for individuals with mental 
illness, we can reduce the incidence of violent and aggressive 
behavior that traditionally precedes restraint and seclusion.  
We also must recognize the liberty interferences and 
psychological injuries that are associated with the use of 
restraint and seclusion and should incorporate within each 
restrained or secluded patient’s plan of care measures to 
respond to such interferences and injuries. 
This article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides an 
abbreviated American history of care for mental illness and a 
contextual framework for understanding current restraint 
and seclusion use.  Part II places today’s restraint and 
seclusion controversy in its proper historical context.  Part III 
 
 15. This Article examines the use of restraint and seclusion in the 
psychiatric context.  Outside the scope of this Article is the use of restraint and 
seclusion with other populations, including individuals with intellectual and 
developmental disabilities and individuals that require acute-level medical and 
surgical care. 
 16. Historians, clinicians, policymakers, and others refer to recurring 
questions regarding the appropriateness of restraint and seclusion use as the 
“restraint controversy.”  See, e.g., Joseph K. Mullen, The Physical Restraint 
Controversy, 9 RECLAIMING CHILD. & YOUTH 92, 92 (2000); Tomes, supra note 5 
(examining “The Great Restraint Controversy”); Dave Ziegler, Is There a 
Therapeutic Value to Physical Restraint?, CHILD. VOICE, July/Aug. 2004, 
available at http://www.cwla.org/articles/cv0407myturn.htm (“This exposé of 
injuries and deaths reported caused by the use of restraint and seclusion is 
often credited with starting the current wave of criticism of restraint and 
seclusion.  The controversy has run the gambit from media coverage to policy 
change and new federal legislation.”). 
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carefully examines the scientific literature supporting and 
opposing the use of psychiatric restraint and seclusion.  This 
section compares late twentieth century studies that conclude 
that restraint and seclusion have a wide range of accepted 
and appropriate uses to recent “survivor” studies and sentinel 
event data, which link these interventions to increased 
patient agitation, injury, and death.  By providing a balanced 
review of the relevant medical literature and available data, 
Part III attempts to dispose of one-sided arguments about 
restraint and seclusion and encourages a more complete 
dialogue regarding the criteria (if any) that justify their use. 
Part IV examines federal and state efforts to regulate the 
use of restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric context.  This 
section shows how lawmakers struggle to establish 
appropriate restraint and seclusion boundaries hundreds of 
years after the introduction of these interventions as methods 
of behavior management. 
Part V places the restraint and seclusion controversy 
within the broader context of the mental health care system.  
Americans generally do not have a constitutional, statutory, 
or common law right to voluntary, non-emergency mental 
health care and available care is under-funded.17  The lack of 
access to, and funding for, basic mental health care 
contributes to emergency, inpatient, and acute mental health 
care, contexts in which restraint and seclusion are used more 
frequently.18  Although federal and state laws prohibit the use 
of restraint and seclusion as a substitute for adequate 
staffing, these mandates are unfunded.19  While the current 
restraint and seclusion discourse correctly considers the 
interventions’ significant risks and liberty interferences, it 
fails to give proper weight to their role in preventing violence 
and patient self-injury in psychiatric emergencies that result 
from unstabilized psychiatric conditions and a lack of access 
to mental health care, not a lack of training regarding 
alternative de-escalation strategies. 
I thus recommend the following approach.  In addition to 
requiring the use of alternative de-escalation strategies if the 
benefits of those strategies outweigh the physical and 
 
 17. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 18. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 19. See discussion infra Parts IV.B-C. 
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psychological risks posed by restraint and seclusion to the 
patient and third parties, my approach would: (1) address the 
root causes of the use of restraint and seclusion; (2) require 
health care providers who use restraint and seclusion to use 
the safest techniques and the most advanced methods of 
patient monitoring; and (3) require health care providers who 
use restraint and seclusion to acknowledge the liberty 
interferences and psychological injuries that result from these 
interventions and incorporate within each restrained or 
secluded patient’s plan of care measures to respond to such 
interferences and injuries.  I conclude that the current non-
restraint movement has important and laudable goals; 
however, lawmakers need to consider a more complete 
dialogue regarding the root causes, implementation, and 
effects of these interventions before adopting blanket 
elimination policies. 
II. CARE FOR MENTAL ILLNESS: A BRIEF AMERICAN HISTORY 
Mental illness posed few significant problems for 
American communities before 1800.20  One theory is that the 
settlers of the English colonies did not encourage individuals 
with mental illness to join them on the Atlantic passage.21  A 
second theory relates to demographics.  The colonist 
population was relatively scattered, and no urban area had 
more than 50,000 residents, and only two areas had 25,000 or 
more residents as late as 1790.22  The number of mentally ill 
colonists was correspondingly small.23  A study of the 
frequency of mental abnormality, including insanity, in the 
official records of the British American and Caribbean 
colonies from 1607 to 1700 identified eighty-two cases of 
mental abnormality among a total population of 
approximately 300,000.24  The study concluded that mental 
illness was not widespread in the early colonies.25 
 
 20. Gerald N. Grob, The Severely and Chronically Mentally Ill in America: 
Retrospect and Prospect, in SICKNESS & HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE 
HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 334, 335 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & 
Ronald L. Numbers eds., 3rd rev. ed., 1997). 
 21. E. FULLER TORREY & JUDY MILLER, THE INVISIBLE PLAGUE: THE RISE 
OF MENTAL ILLNESS FROM 1750 TO THE PRESENT 193 (2001). 
 22. Grob, supra note 20, at 335. 
 23. Id. 
 24. TORREY & MILLER, supra note 21, at 194. 
 25. Id. 
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Until the late nineteenth century, the only recognized 
form of mental illness was “insanity,” loosely defined as a 
condition in which an individual is “unable to function in 
society because of delusions, hallucinations, incoherent 
speech, paranoia, depression, or withdrawal from social 
relationships.”26  The colonists believed that the cause of 
insanity rested with God and could not be eliminated.27  The 
result was that the biological and social sources of insanity 
received little attention during the colonial period.28  Non-
institutional methods for responding to insanity seemed 
appropriate, and the colonists generally left the insane in the 
care of their families and supported them, in case of need, as 
one of the poor.29  Poorhouses, almshouses, and even prisons 
provided institutional support when necessary.30 
Family, poorhouse, and almshouse support gave way to 
hospitals and insane asylums in the late eighteenth century.31  
The first American’ hospitals, the Pennsylvania Hospital 
(1751) and the New York Hospital (1791), had as a primary 
goal the care of the insane.32  At first, the Pennsylvania 
Hospital provided care to the insane in the basement of its 
main building.33  In 1841, the hospital opened a new building 
 
 26. William G. Rothstein, A Historical Analysis of the Treatment of the 
Mentally Ill, in READINGS IN AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES IN 
SOCIO-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 281, 281 (William G. Rothstein ed., 1995). 
 27. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM: SOCIAL ORDER 
AND DISORDER IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 109 (1971). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Grob, supra note 20, at 335; ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xiii; EDWARD 
SHORTER, A HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE ERA OF THE ASYLUM TO THE 
AGE OF PROZAC 49 (1997); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 72 (1949); TORREY & MILLER, supra note 21, at 194. 
 30. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xiii-xix. 
 31. Andrew Scull, The Discovery of the Asylum Revisited: Lunacy Reform in 
the New American Republic, in MADHOUSES, MAD-DOCTORS, AND MADMEN: THE 
SOCIAL HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY IN THE VICTORIAN ERA 144, 145 (Andrew Scull 
ed., 1981) [hereinafter MADHOUSES].  But see MENTAL HYGIENE TASK FORCE, 
N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, AN EVALUATION OF THE DELIVERY OF MENTAL HYGIENE 
SERVICES IN NEW YORK STATE 8 (2005), available at 
http://www.assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Mental/20050303/ (noting that New 
York State permitted the confinement of individuals with mental illness in jails 
and poorhouses until the late nineteenth century). 
 32. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RISE OF 
AMERICA’S HOSPITAL SYSTEM 33 (1987); Morris J. Vogel, The Transformation of 
the American Hospital, in INSTITUTIONS OF CONFINEMENT: HOSPITALS, 
ASYLUMS, AND PRISONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA, 1500-1950, 
at 39, 41 (Norbert Finzsch & Robert Jutte eds., 1996). 
 33. Scull, supra note 31, at 145. 
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that was designed exclusively for the care of the insane.34  
The New York Hospital housed its “maniacs” first in the 
basement and then in a new third story35 until 1808, when a 
separate building for the insane was constructed on the 
hospital’s grounds.36  This separate building, which later 
moved to a different part of the city, became known as the 
Bloomington Asylum.37 
The first American hospital devoted exclusively to the 
care and cure of the insane opened in Williamsburg, Virginia, 
in 1773.38  Williamsburg’s “Public Hospital for Persons of 
Insane and Disordered Minds”39 was the only facility of its 
kind until 1824, when the state of Kentucky established its 
Eastern Lunatic Asylum.40  By 1861, forty-eight asylums had 
been established in the United States, including thirty-two 
public asylums in twenty-five states, one federal asylum for 
the District of Columbia, and fifteen small private asylums 
devoted to paying patients.41  By 1880, approximately eighty 
public institutions for the mentally ill existed in the United 
States.42  By 1920, approximately 521 mental hospitals had 
been established.43  Known as the “age of the asylum,” some 
historians interpret this period as one of medical reform.44  
Others believe that mental illness was socially, and not just 
medically, constructed,45 and that the insane asylum was an 
attempt to restore a necessary social balance to the new 
 
 34. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 33. 
 35. Scull, supra note 31, at 146. 
 36. ROSENBERG, supra note 32, at 33-34. 
 37. Id. at 34. 
 38. SHORTER, supra note 29, at 45. 
 39. Colonial Williamsburg, Public Hospital, 
http://www.history.org/Almanack/places/hb/hbhos.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2007). 
 40. EDWARD B. BEIS, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW 4 (1984). 
 41. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 282; see also Grob, supra note 20, at 335 
(“[B]y the Civil War, almost every state had established one or more public 
institutions for [the mentally ill].”). 
 42. BARBARA SICHERMAN, THE QUEST FOR MENTAL HEALTH IN AMERICA: 
1880-1917, at 13-14 (1980). 
 43. STARR, supra note 29, at 169. 
 44. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xiv (coining the period “age of the asylum”); 
see also Clive Unsworth, Law and Lunacy in Psychiatry’s ‘Golden Age,’ 13 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 479, 481 (1993) (“With the arrival of the carceral era, . 
. . . [a] new system combined an extensive network of lunatic asylums, public 
and private, in which patients were legally detained . . . .”). 
 45. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xv. 
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republic.46 
A. Physical Care 
At the time of the opening of the Williamsburg facility, 
mental illness was considered a disease of the brain and the 
nervous system, and individuals who were mentally ill were 
treated as though they chose to be irrational.47  Treatments 
were primarily physical and medical, and consisted of 
seclusion, mechanical and medicinal restraints, plunge baths 
and other “shock” water treatments, bleeding, and blistering 
salves.48  By modern standards these treatments undoubtedly 
seem cruel.  But at a time when the mysteries of 
schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety, and 
agitation had yet to be unlocked, these treatments were 
considered humane.  Seclusion, or the solitary confinement of 
individuals in “quiet rooms,” was believed to be particularly 
effective in calming severely agitated individuals.49  In 1799, 
two dungeon-like cells were dug under the first floor of the 
Williamsburg facility.50  Patients who experienced “state[s] of 
raving phrenzy”51 were involuntarily maintained in the dark 
and gloomy52 cells for hours, days,53 months,54 years55 and, 
sometimes, on a permanent basis.56 
 
 46. Id. at xviii. 
 47. Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 39. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Cotton, supra note 3, at 443-44 (discussing the use of quiet rooms). 
 50. Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 39. 
 51. Id. 
 52. ROBERT WALN, JR., AN ACCOUNT OF THE ASYLUM FOR THE INSANE 3, 6 
(Phila., Benjamin & Thomas Kite, 1825), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/bookres.fcgi/history/pdf_waln.pdf (describing 
the dark and gloomy solitary confinement chambers at Philadelphia’s Friends 
Asylum in 1825). 
 53. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (reporting the seclusion of a 
Missouri man for thirty days in 1999). 
 54. WALN, supra note 52, at 23-24 (reporting the eighteen-month seclusion 
of a patient at Philadelphia’s Friends Asylum in the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century). 
 55. Elizabeth Stawicki, A Haunting Legacy: Canton Insane Asylum for 
American Indians (Minnesota Public Radio broadcast Dec. 9, 1997) (audio and 
transcript available at 
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/199712/09_stawickie_asylum/) 
(reporting  the three-year seclusion of a patient at South Dakota’s Canton 
Insane Asylum). 
 56. WALN, supra note 52, at 24 (reporting the “permanent” seclusion of a 
Friends Asylum patient). 
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Mechanical restraints, including straitjackets, muffs, leg-
locks, handcuffs, and “coercion chairs,” were also popular.57  
These mechanisms were believed to help agitated patients 
regain their self-control.58  Straitjackets (cloth or canvas coats 
that crossed patients’ hands or arms in front of their bodies 
and secured them to the opposite sides) were believed to be 
particularly humane, and far gentler than the shackles and 
chains used in prisons.59  Straitjackets applied no weighted 
pressure to the arms or body, caused fewer skin abrasions, 
and allowed some form of movement.60 
Benjamin Rush, the father of American psychiatry, 
developed in 1811 his famous “tranquilizer chair,” considered 
by some to be the most complete human restraint ever 
devised.61  The tranquilizer chair featured a wooden chair 
with an adjustable backboard.62  At the top of the backboard 
was a wooden box lined with stuffed linen that secured the 
patient’s head and prevented it from moving from side to 
side.63  Chest, belly, arm, and hand bands, made of flat pieces 
of strong leather, limited movement, and wood ankle 
bracelets confined the feet.64  To the underside of the chair 
was fastened a half water-filled stool pan that could be 
emptied and replaced without disturbing the patient.  The 
legs of the chair were fastened to the floor.65  Some patients 
reportedly were strapped to tranquilizer chairs for as long as 
six months.66 
B. Moral Treatment 
Less physical methods of treating insanity grew in 
popularity after the American Revolution, in part because of 
the influential writings of Philippe Pinel in France and 
 
 57. See JOHN CONOLLY, THE TREATMENT OF THE INSANE WITHOUT 
MECHANICAL RESTRAINTS (Arno Press 1973) (1866). 
 58. Kansas State Historical Society, Straitjacket, 
http://www.kshs.org/cool3/straitjacket.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Rush, supra note 5, at 671, fig.134. 
 62. Id. at 671. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Legends of Am., Glore Psychiatric Museum in St. Joseph, MO, 
http://www.legendsofamerica.com/MO-PsychiatricMuseum2.html (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2007). 
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Samuel Tuke in England.67  Pinel and Tuke insisted that kind 
and gentle treatment, known as “moral treatment,” could 
cure insanity.68  Moral treatment was based on the idea that a 
beautiful location and an appropriate social and physical 
environment could have curative powers.69 American insane 
asylums in the mid-nineteenth century adopted the 
philosophy of moral treatment and emphasized kindness over 
coercion.70  The daily routine of patients treated in accordance 
with this philosophy included occupational therapy, religious 
exercises, “amusements,” “games,”71 and plenty of rest in cells 
furnished with beds and other comforts.72  T. Romeyn Beck, a 
New York physician, explained the trend towards moral 
treatment: “Coercion by blows, stripes and chains, although 
sanctioned by the authority of Celsus and Cullen, is now 
justly laid aside . . . .”73 
Consistent with the philosophy of moral treatment, in 
1851 the Association of Medical Superintendents of American 
Institutions for the Insane (AMSAII), the predecessor of the 
American Psychiatric Association, adopted twenty-six 
standards (Standards) relating to the location and 
construction of asylums.74  The Standards required insane 
asylums to be “located in the country, not within less than 
two miles of a large town, and easily accessible at all 
 
 67. Robert Gardiner Hill, A Lecture on the Management of Lunatic Asylums, 
and the Treatment of the Insane, in THREE HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 
886, 887.  See generally Pinel, supra note 6, at 602-13 (discussing the pioneering 
work of Pinel); Samuel Tuke, The Retreat: An Institution in New York, in THREE 
HUNDRED YEARS, supra note 4, at 684, 684-90 (discussing the work of Tuke). 
 68. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at 109-10; Rothstein, supra note 26, at 281. 
 69. See, e.g., SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 15; Grob, supra note 20, at 336 
(“There were to be no threats of physical violence; and only rarely were 
mechanical means of restraint to be employed.”); Note, Liability of Mental 
Hospitals for Acts of Their Patients Under the Open Door Policy, 57 VA. L. REV. 
156, 158 (1971) (discussing the tolerating and accepting attitudes that 
characterized the moral treatment philosophy); Rothstein, supra note 26, at 
281-82 (“Moral treatment consisted of a morally and religiously uplifting 
environment and care by compassionate attendants who treated the patients 
with persuasion and sympathy rather than coercion, although restraint was 
employed when necessary.”). 
 70. See, e.g., SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 15. 
 71. Grob, supra note 20, at 336. 
 72. Colonial Williamsburg, supra note 39. 
 73. ALEX BEAM, GRACEFULLY INSANE: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICA’S 
PREMIER MENTAL HOSPITAL 11 (2001). 
 74. SARAH C. SITTON, LIFE AT THE TEXAS STATE LUNATIC ASYLUM: 1857-
1997, at 11 (1999). 
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seasons.”75  The Standards also required insane asylums to 
devote not less than fifty acres to pleasure gardens for use by 
patients.76  The stated reasons for the geographic and garden 
requirements were to remove patients from the stress of 
urban living while ensuring, through proximity to town, ease 
of provisioning and access for visitors.77  Three years after 
AMSAII adopted these Standards, Dr. Thomas Kirkbride, 
superintendent of the prestigious Pennsylvania Hospital for 
the Insane, published his famous linear plan for the 
construction of insane asylums.78  The plan, which featured a 
central structure with wings on the side, was believed to 
contribute to the restoration of sanity.79 
C. Custodial Care 
The successive philosophies of physical treatment and 
moral treatment eventually gave way to custodial care.80  
After the middle of the nineteenth century, the asylum 
superintendents’ administrative duties overwhelmed their 
medical duties.81  As a result, custodial care, also called 
patient warehousing, became commonplace.82  The asylums 
lacked adequate staff to provide treatment, and asylum 
attendants were not properly trained to work with 
 
 75. Id. at 12. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at 134; SITTON, supra note 75, at 4; Kenneth 
D. Gaver, Mental Illness and Mental Retardation: The History of State Care in 
Texas, IMPACT, July/Aug. 1975, at 5.  Although Kirkbride and his followers 
believed that the structure of the asylum contributed to mental health, others 
believe that the imposing structure of the asylum was needed to convince the 
public of the importance of the emerging specialty of psychiatry.  See, e.g., 
Nancy J. Tomes, A Generous Confidence: Thomas Story Kirkbride’s Philosophy 
of Asylum Construction and Management, in MADHOUSES, supra note 31, at 
121, 123  (“In the campaign to promote the asylum and the medical specialty 
associated with it, asylum construction and management played a key role.  The 
hospital’s unique appearance and regimen offered proof to the families of the 
afflicted that these doctors were making use of a radical new treatment for a 
dreaded ailment.  In distinguishing themselves from competitors, the asylum 
was by far the most impressive item in the superintendents’ therapeutic 
armamentarium.  The mental hospital served as their professional showcase, 
their most effective public advertisement.”). 
 79. SITTON, supra note 75, at 4. 
 80. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 282. 
 81. Id. at 283. 
 82. Id. 
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individuals who suffered from mental illness.83  Restraints, 
which were supposed to be used only occasionally under the 
philosophy of moral treatment, were used more frequently to 
maintain order.84  Some patients remained in restraints for 
days.85 
A belated example of patient warehousing involved 
Osawatomie State Hospital, which was established in Kansas 
in 1866.  Osawatomie State Hospital had twelve beds at the 
time of its opening.86  By the end of 1867, the Hospital had 
twenty-two patients with fifty more desiring admission.87  A 
ratio of one physician per 845 patients had developed by 
1945.88  To manage the large patient body, attendants 
resorted to the use of force with male patients, and 
straitjackets and wrist-cuffs with female patients.89  In 1950, 
the Kansas City Star published a series of articles on the 
conditions at Osawatomie and other state hospitals.  
According to these reports, up to one-half of the Osawatomie 
patient population was straitjacketed at any given time.90  
Documentation shows that Osawatomie State Hospital 
continued to straitjacket its patients until at least 1956.91 
D. Community Care 
By the late nineteenth century, the majority view was 
that insane asylums did not cure mental illness.92  Pliny 
Earle, psychiatrist and co-founder of the American Medical 
Association, documented his belief as early as 1887 that 
asylum superintendents had greatly exaggerated their earlier 
recovery rates, thus contributing to the cult of curability.93  
This changing perspective resulted in a reexamination of the 
methods of treating mental illness.94  In 1880, one group of 
 
 83. Kansas State Historical Society, supra note 58. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Kansas State Historical Society, supra note 58. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 12. 
 93. PLINY EARLE, THE CURABILITY OF INSANITY 22 (Arno Press Inc. 1972) 
(1887). 
 94. SICHERMAN, supra note 42, at 12. 
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psychiatrists, neurologists, and lay individuals who believed 
that the then-current system of providing mental health care 
was deficient organized the National Association for the 
Protection of the Insane and the Prevention of Insanity 
(NAPIPI).95  The primary purpose of NAPIPI was to improve 
conditions within insane asylums and to reverse the growing 
trend of insanity through preventive treatment.96 
At the turn of the century, insane asylums began to lose 
their centrality and identity as the best means of treating 
insanity.97  As America became more industrialized, new 
outpatient centers began to replace the asylum as a means for 
dealing with mental health conditions.98  At the same time, 
the concept of mental illness began to expand due, in part, to 
World War I and the mental hygiene movement.99  World War 
I transformed views of mental illness from a “vague 
abstraction into a meaningful illness” as soldiers suffered 
from “shell shock” and “war neurosis.”100  In addition, the 
science of promoting mental health and preventing mental 
illness through the application of psychiatry and psychology 
emerged in part as a result of Clifford W. Beers’s 1908 
autobiography, A Mind That Found Itself, which described his 
experiences in institutions for the insane.101  Using the phrase 
“mental hygiene” to describe his ideas,102 Beers founded the 
Connecticut Society for Mental Hygiene (1908) and the 
National Committee for Mental Hygiene (1909).103  The goals 
of both groups were  to improve the quality of care for the 
mentally ill, to prevent mental illness when possible, and to 
ensure the availability of accurate information relating to 
mental health.104 
By the 1940s, few individuals believed that the 
 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 12-13. 
 97. See ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at xvi-xvii (stating that “new methods 
replaced the asylum for dealing with social problems”). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 284-85. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See generally MIRIAM SIEGLER & HUMPHRY OSMOND, MODELS OF 
MADNESS, MODELS OF MEDICINE 147 (1974) (discussing Beers’ contributions to 
the community mental health movement). 
 102. Id. 
 103. See Clifford Beers Found. Home Page, 
http://www.cliffordbeersfoundation.co.uk/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
 104. Rothstein, supra note 26, at 284-85. 
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structured environment of the asylum could cure mental 
illness.105  Some individuals even doubted the custodial 
benefit of the asylum.106  The national census of mental 
hospitals declined from a peak of 634,000 in 1954 to 579,000 
in 1963.107  One prominent, though contested, explanation for 
the census drop was the discovery of psychopharmacology,108 
including medicinal tranquilizers, neuroleptics, and 
antidepressants.  Under this theory, “patients who were 
previously hospitalized ‘could now be safely treated, or at 
least more safely ignored,’ on an outpatient basis.”109  Another 
explanation for the decline in number of mental hospitals lies 
in Congress’ 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act, 
which provided greater aid to states to support aged 
individuals in nursing homes.110  By transferring patients 
from mental hospitals to nursing homes, states could obtain 
more reimbursement from the federal government.111  A final 
explanation was provided by the new “community psychiatry” 
advocates, who argued that “state hospitals reinforced 
disability and isolation, [but that] local services and halfway 
houses could help return the mentally ill to normal roles in 
society.”112 
By the mid-1900’s, a combination of forces likely caused 
the “near emptying” of state mental hospitals.113  Many 
asylum patients were discharged and individuals who would 
have been admitted to an asylum in the past were referred to 
community centers.114  The initial trends in American mental 
health care (physical, moral, and custodial) gave way to the 
current philosophy of community mental health care.115  With 
 
 105. SITTON, supra note 75, at 132. 
 106. Id. 
 107. STARR, supra note 29, at 365. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. SITTON, supra note 75, at 7. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Cf. Unsworth, supra note 44, at 479 (dividing the history of the 
provision for individuals with mental disorders into three eras: (1) pre-
carceral—“before the mass consignment of the mentally disordered to 
specialized institutions had taken place”; (2) carceral—characterized by the 
powerful insane asylum; and (3) post-carceral—“encompassing the 
transformation in legal relations which has accompanied the attempt to close 
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the advent of deinstitutionalization116 and the growth of 
community support programs, fewer psychiatric patients are 
restrained or secluded for behavior management.117  Many 
believe, however, that the “deinstitutionalization of 
individuals with less serious illness has resulted in an 
inpatient population with more severe mental illness.”118 
III. THE CURRENT RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION CONTROVERSY 
Although used less frequently in the twenty-first century, 
restraint and seclusion persist as methods of behavior 
management.119  Current methods of restraint include drugs, 
mechanical devices, and physical holding by another 
person.120  Drugs fall within the definition of  “restraints” 
when they are used “to manage the patient’s behavior or 
restrict the patient’s freedom of movement and [are] not a 
standard treatment for the patient’s condition.”121  They 
include sedatives (such as Ativan), antipsychotic drugs (such 
as Haldol), and other drugs usually given by injection that 
alter mood, mental status, or behavior.122  Mechanical devices 
used to restrain patients include two-point restraints (which 
immobilize an individual’s hands using a nylon, cotton, fur-
lined, quilted, or leather cuff around each wrist),123 four-point 
 
the asylum and substitute non-institutional alternatives”). 
 116. See Meredith Karasch, Note, Where Involuntary Commitment, Civil 
Liberties, and the Right to Mental Health Care Collide: An Overview of 
California’s Mental Illness System, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 493, 495 (2003) (discussing 
deinstitutionalization in the mid-twentieth century). 
 117. Lentini, supra note 6, at 8. 
 118. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 4; see also Steven S. Sharfstein, Seclusion 
and Restraint, 16 PSYCHIATRIC TIMES 1, 1 (1999) (“Deinstitutionalization of the 
mentally ill over the last 30 years has created a public health crisis across the 
country.”). 
 119. See generally Kim J. Masters, Modernizing Seclusion and Restraint, 
May 28, 2005, at 2 (noting the similarity between current and old methods of 
restraint and seclusion: “Very little fundamental change has occurred to 
restraint and seclusion devices and monitoring equipment since 1794, when 
Philippe Pinel developed humane practices for helping psychiatric patients 
manage episodes of violence.”). 
 120. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 1 n.l. 
 121. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(1)(i)(B) (2007). 
 122. Daniel Watson, The Crazy Shift, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept./Oct. 2000, at 
68, 69, available at http://psychologytoday.com/articles/pto-20000901-
000037.html (describing the chemical restraint of an emergent psychiatric 
patient using Ativan and Haldol). 
 123. See, e.g., EMS Medical Products, Posey Restraints, 
http://www.emsmedicalproducts.com/b20.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) 
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restraints (which immobilize a person on a bed or gurney 
with a cuff around each wrist and each ankle), and five-point 
restraints (which add an additional belt around the waist), as 
well as a variety of finger-control mitts, vests, jackets, body 
nets, and tightly-tucked sheet wraps.124  Physical holds 
usually involve one or more staff members holding a patient’s 
arms; or lying across, sitting across, or straddling a patient’s 
body while the patient is in a prone (face-down), supine (face-
up), or seated position.125  Physical holds traditionally 
included “basket holds” (in which the patient’s arms were 
crisscrossed over her chest and held from behind while the 
patient was eased to the ground) as well as a variety of other 
aptly-named holds.126  Modern seclusion usually involves an 
involuntary confinement of an individual in a small room or a 
single bedroom.127 
A. Restraint and Seclusion Perspectives 
Perspectives regarding psychiatric restraint and 
seclusion vary.  One traditional position is that restraint and 
seclusion may be used to calm violent and assaultive patients, 
teach patients how to control themselves, and preserve the 
calm of the psychiatric ward.  A second position is that 
restraint and seclusion carry significant physical and 
 
(illustrating a variety of wrist and ankle cuffs). 
 124. See, e.g., Rehabmart Discount Medical Equipment, Restraints, 
http://www.rehabmart.com/category/Restraints.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) 
(illustrating a variety of wrist and ankle cuffs, belts, finger-control mitts, vests, 
jackets, and body nets). 
 125. Letter from Wan J. Kim, Assistant Attorney General, to the Honorable 
Rick Perry, Governor of Texas 23-26 (Dec. 11, 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/lubbock_sch_findlet_12-11-06.pdf 
(describing incidents of physical restraint, including staff members lying on top 
of face-down and side-lying residents); David M. Day,  A Review of the 
Literature on the Effectiveness of Physical Restraints  in Children and Youth, 
at slide 9 (June 1-4, 2005), available at http://rccp.cornell.edu/pdfs/dday.pdf 
(describing the prone and supine holds). 
 126. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (describing the basket hold); 
Rhonda Bodfield, CPS Finds 4 Cases of Abuse at Desert Hills in 5 Years, ARIZ. 
DAILY STAR, Mar. 4, 1998, at 1A (describing a number of instances in which 
physical holds were used to control youths at an Arizona behavioral treatment 
facility); David Allen, Risk & Prone Restraint: Reviewing the Evidence, at 
http://rccp.cornell.edu/pdfs/allen.pdf#search=%22physical%20holds%20used%20
to%20restrain%20children%22 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) (illustrating how 
asphyxia can occur during various physical holds). 
 127. Pyle, supra note 10. 
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psychological risks, although they may be used in some 
emergency situations.  A third position is taken by some 
individuals who have survived incidences of restraint and 
seclusion, but not without physical or psychological injury.  
Called “survivor literature,” these reports emphasize patients’ 
unfavorable views of their restraint and seclusion 
experiences.  A fourth position is that psychiatric restraint 
and seclusion are inherently dangerous and should be 
eliminated.  Each of these positions is discussed in more 
detail below. 
The first position is that restraint and seclusion have a 
wide range of accepted and appropriate uses, including 
calming violent and assaultive patients, teaching patients 
how to control themselves and preserving the psychiatric 
ward milieu.128  Support for this traditional position is found 
in a number of scientific studies and medical journal articles 
published in the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s.  For example, 
one study argued that seclusion does obtain desired 
behavioral results, including control of violence and reduction 
of anxiety.129  Other studies emphasize that restraint and 
seclusion are necessary for sustaining the “smooth 
functioning” of the ward minisociety and can help agitated 
individuals calm themselves.130  Another study justified the 
use of restraint and seclusion for patients who, without such 
interventions, may have engaged in deliberate self-injury.131  
Yet another study firmly concluded that the use of restraint 
and seclusion offer therapeutic and control functions for 
patients and staff. 132  A final illustrative study concluded 
 
 128. See, e.g., Renee L. Binder & Susan M. McCoy, A Study of Patients’ 
Attitudes Toward Placement in Seclusion, 34 HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 
1052, 1052 (1983) (“[S]eclusion is an accepted treatment modality on many 
psychiatric inpatient units . . . .”); Cotton, supra note 3, at 442 (discussing at 
length the psychiatric benefits of seclusion); Harriet Wadeson & William T. 
Carpenter, Impact of the Seclusion Room Experience, 163 J. NERVOUS & 
MENTAL DISEASE 318, 318 (1976) (“The seclusion room is an important, but 
ambivalently perceived aspect of psychiatric inpatient units.”). 
 129. Wadeson & Carpenter, supra note 129, at 318. 
 130. Donald S. Gair, Limit-Setting and Seclusion in the Psychiatric Hospital, 
17 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION 15, 15 (1980); Robert H. Plutchik et al., Toward a 
Rationale for the Seclusion Process, 166 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 571, 
571 (1978). 
 131. Kenneth Tardiff, Emergency Control Measures for Psychiatric 
Inpatients, 169 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 614, 618 (1981). 
 132. Paul H. Soloff & Samuel M. Turner, Patterns of Seclusion: A Prospective 
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that seclusion is one intervention that “can be effective in 
treating . . . impulsive, relationship-resistant children who 
have been unable to learn internal control from other 
socialization interactions.”133 
A second perspective recognizes the value of restraint 
and seclusion in some emergency situations, but emphasizes 
the significant physical and psychological risks associated 
with these interventions.  For example, the author of one 
review article found that it was “nearly impossible” to operate 
a program for severely symptomatic individuals without the 
use of some form of restraint or seclusion, and that restraint 
and seclusion are efficacious in preventing injury and 
reducing agitation.134  The author also found, however, that 
restraint and seclusion can have substantial deleterious 
physical and (more often) psychological effects on both 
patients and staff.135  The author of a second review article 
agreed that “[t]he clinical reality is that an acutely assaultive 
and violent patient risks his or her safety and that of other 
patients and staff.”136  The author also found, however, that: 
(1) staff decision making regarding restraint and seclusion 
was inconsistent and that the gender, education level, and 
clinical experiences of the staff affected their ordering 
decisions; (2) “nonpharmacologic, programmatic changes can 
be implemented that diminish dramatically the use of 
restraint and seclusion in child/adolescent, and adult 
populations”; and (3) “when control of patient aggression is 
needed acutely, there are no data to guide clinical decisions 
as to which combination of [restraint and seclusion] . . . would 
be better in specific patient populations.”137 
A third perspective is found in the “survivor literature,” 
which collects patients’ unfavorable reports of their 
experiences with restraint and seclusion.138  One study 
 
Study, 169 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 37, 37 (1981). 
 133. David Fassler & Nancy Cotton, A National Survey on the Use of 
Seclusion in the Psychiatric Treatment of Children, 43 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 370, 373 (1992). 
 134. William A. Fisher, Restraint and Seclusion: A Review of the Literature, 
151 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1584, 1590 (1994). 
 135. Id. at 1584, 1590. 
 136. Alisa B. Busch & Miles F. Shore, Seclusion and Restraint: A Review of 
Recent Literature, 8 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 261, 262 (2000). 
 137. Id. at 268. 
 138. See Patricia A. Amos, New Considerations in the Prevention of Aversives, 
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examining such literature found that “patients presented a 
universally negative view of the seclusion experience when 
reacting directly to the event,”139 and concluded that greater 
care is required in the imposition of seclusion.140  A second 
study found that patients retrospectively viewed their 
seclusion experiences as negative and anxiety-provoking.141  A 
third study found from patient descriptions that seclusion 
was a “painful experience associated with feelings of 
helplessness, fear, sadness, and anger.”142  A widely-cited 
study reporting the responses of 1040 former psychiatric 
patients regarding their experiences in inpatient psychiatric 
treatment facilities in New York State found that the vast 
majority of the respondents who had been restrained or 
secluded viewed the experience negatively.143  Ninety-four 
percent of these respondents noted at least one complaint 
about their restraint and seclusion experience144 and seventy-
three percent of the respondents stated that they were not 
dangerous to themselves or others at the time they were 
restrained or secluded.145  The New York patients also 
indicated that they: (1) did not know the reason for their 
restraint or seclusion; (2) felt that the interventions were 
humiliating, punishing, and depressing; and (3) thought that 
staff control of patients was a primary factor in the use of 
restraint and seclusion.146  Patient narratives are prominent 
in the survivor literature: 
I can’t bring myself to describe the moment-by-moment 
struggles and shear gut-wrenching terror of being put into 
 
Restraint, and Seclusion: Incorporating the Role of Relationships into an 
Ecological Perspective, 29 RESEARCH & PRACTICE FOR PERSONS WITH SEVERE 
DISABILITIES 263, 266 (2004). 
 139. Wadeson & Carpenter, supra note 129, at 327. 
 140. Id. at 328. 
 141. Binder & McCoy, supra note 129, at 1053.  The study also found, 
however, that seclusion remains a necessary method of dealing with violent and 
agitated patients.  Id. 
 142. Kathryn Hammill et al., Hospitalized Schizophrenic Patient Views About 
Seclusion, 50 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 174, 174 (1989) (finding that patients 
believed seclusion was “necessary” for the “control of disruptive aggressive 
patient behaviors”). 
 143. Nancy K. Ray et al., Patient Perspectives on Restraint and Seclusion 
Experiences: A Survey of Former Patients of New York State Psychiatric 
Facilities, 20 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 11, 11 (1996). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 14. 
 146. See id. at 15. 
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five-point restraint. . . . I don’t feel comfortable wearing 
watches any more and for a long time belts were out of the 
question. . . . The terror of confinement, the pain of the 
restraint, and the wound to my soul made me want to stay 
as far away from the mental health system as possible.147 
A final perspective is that restraint and seclusion should 
be prohibited in the psychiatric setting.148  This position, 
which is supported by research showing that physical force, 
immobilization, and isolation are dehumanizing and that 
seclusion and restraint risk lives and significant emotional 
injury,149 is discussed in more detail later in this article.150 
The reasons for these varying scientific opinions 
regarding restraint and seclusion also have been studied.151  
One author suggests that scientific attitudes depend on the 
context in which the research was conducted.152  Authors who 
support the use of restraint and seclusion  may conduct their 
research in public psychiatric facilities, while opponents of 
these interventions conduct their research in private or 
university hospitals.153  A second pair of co-authors suggests 
that attitudes about the use of restraint and seclusion depend 
on the particular scientific inquiry.154  Scientific inquiries into 
the efficaciousness of restraint and seclusion for preventing 
violence and aggression tend to support their use, whereas 
studies that examine the experience and opinions of patients 
who have been restrained and secluded tend to oppose their 
use.155 
 
 147. William Pflueger, Consumer View: Restraint Is Not Therapeutic, 
NETWORKS, Summer/Fall 2002, at 7, 7, available at 
http://www.nasmhpd.org/general_files/publications/ntac_pubs/networks/Summe
rFall2002.pdf. 
 148. LeBel & Huckshorn, supra note 11, at 577. 
 149. NATIONAL CALL, supra note 11, at 5; POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 
11. 
 150. See infra Part III.C. 
 151. See, e.g., Sam Tsemberis & Cornelius Sullivan, Seclusion in Context: 
Introducing a Seclusion Room into a Children’s Unit of a Municipal Hospital, 58 
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 462 (1988). 
 152. Id. at 462. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Dave Ziegler & Dan Silver, Considering the Literature on Restraint and 
Seclusion: Is There Support That These Interventions Are Harmful? 3-4, 
available at http://rccp.cornell.edu/pdfs/Zeigler.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2007). 
 155. See id. 
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B. Data Linking Restraint and Seclusion to Injury and 
Death 
In the past decade, data regarding the use of restraint 
and seclusion and related injuries and deaths has been 
collected and reported by the media as well as a number of 
private and governmental organizations.  The most 
prominent of these reports surfaced in 1998, when the 
Hartford Courant issued a week-long investigative report into 
the number and types of deaths of individuals with 
psychiatric or developmental disabilities that occurred across 
the nation or shortly after these individuals were restrained 
or secluded in psychiatric hospitals, psychiatric units of 
general hospitals, group homes, residential facilities for 
troubled youths, or centers and group homes for individuals 
with intellectual disabilities.156  Many of the 142 deaths 
identified by the Courant were caused by asphyxiation, 
suffocation, strangulation, smothering, a broken neck, cardiac 
arrest, blunt trauma to the head, stress due to restraint, 
shock, or dehydration.157  Twenty-three of the 142 individuals, 
according to the report, died after staff restrained them by 
crossing the individuals’ arms across their chests and placing 
them in prone floor holds.158  Another twenty individuals died 
after they were tied up in leather wrist and ankle cuffs or 
vests, having been ignored for hours.159  The report suggested 
that federal and state regulators, health officials, and the 
legal system “failed to observe” or “willfully ignored” these 
deaths, and recommended mandatory reporting of deaths that 
occur during or following restraint or seclusion.160  According 
to the Courant report, the mandatory reports should form the 
bases of alerts sent to the health care provider community 
 
 156. See, e.g., For the Record: 11 Months, 23 Dead, HARTFORD COURANT 
(Conn.), Oct. 11, 1998, at A11, available at 
http://www.pcma.com/crisis_intervention_news/deadly_restraint/faces.stm (part 
of the newspaper’s five-part investigative series “Deadly Restraint: A 
Nationwide Pattern of Death,” published October 11-15, 1998); Weiss, supra 
note 14 (same). 
 157. Weiss, supra note 14. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
TOVINO FINAL 8/8/2007  11:12:33 AM 
2007] PSYCHIATRIC RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION 535 
regarding unsafe restraint and seclusion practices.161 
Even before the Courant report, state agencies were 
collecting and analyzing data regarding the dangers of the 
use of psychiatric restraint and seclusion.  In 1994, for 
example, the New York State Commission on Quality of Care 
issued two reports examining restraint and seclusion 
practices in New York’s state psychiatric facilities.162  The 
second report surveyed former psychiatric patients and found 
that “patients who were restrained or secluded during their 
inpatient stays “overwhelmingly report[ed] [that] these 
interventions were used illegally and that they were often 
poorly treated, abused or injured when restrained or 
secluded.”163  Approximately one-third of the respondents also 
reported that they were concerned for their safety and well-
being while inpatients, and that their basic rights of dignity 
and privacy were violated.164  Other respondents reported 
unnecessary force, psychological abuse, physical abuse, 
sexual abuse, and ridicule and threats by staff during 
restraint and seclusion.165  Still other respondents reported 
that restraint and seclusion were used as punishments for not 
taking medication or obeying staff.166  Reports regarding the 
lack of periodic bathroom, exercise, meal, and water breaks 
during episodes of restraint and seclusion also were noted.167 
Health care accreditation agencies also have collected 
and analyzed data regarding the use of restraint and 
seclusion and related injuries and deaths.168  The Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO) found that the cause of death in forty percent of the 
 
 161. See id. 
 162. See N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON QUALITY OF CARE, RESTRAINT AND 
SECLUSION PRACTICES IN NEW YORK STATE PSYCHIATRIC FACILITIES (1994); 
N.Y. STATE COMM’N ON QUALITY OF CARE, VOICES FROM THE FRONTLINE: 
PATIENTS’ PERSPECTIVES OF RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION USE (1994). 
 163. N.Y. State Comm’n on Quality of Care, (2 Reports) Restraint and 
Seclusion Practices in New York State Psychiatric Facilities, and Voices from 
the Frontline: Patients’ Perspectives of Restraint and Seclusion Use, Sept. 1994, 
http://www.cqcapd.state.ny.us/publications/pubvoice.htm. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See, e.g., Preventing Restraint Deaths, SENTINEL EVENT ALERT (Joint 
Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs.), Nov. 18, 1998, available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/SentinelEvents/SentinelEventAlert/sea_8.htm. 
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cases reported was asphyxiation, including asphyxiation due 
to staff placing excess weight on the back of patients 
restrained in the prone position, placing towels or sheets over 
patients’ heads to protect against spitting or biting, and 
obstructing patients’ airways when pulling the patients’ arms 
across their necks.169  JCAHO’s sentinel event alert identified 
several strategies for reducing these risks, including more 
thorough patient assessments, earlier interventions with less 
restrictive measures, adequate staff-to-patient ratios, and the 
continuous observance of restrained patients.170 
Mental health consumer advocacy organizations such as 
the National Alliance on Mental Illness (NAMI) have 
collected restraint and seclusion use, injury, and death data 
and have publicized dangerous restraint and seclusion 
practices and incidents.171  According to NAMI, an Oregon 
woman was secluded for more than thirty hours in an Oregon 
hospital in December 1998 without being allowed to use the 
restroom or to contact relatives.172  A man in Missouri was 
restrained for twenty-one days and secluded for thirty days in 
a state psychiatric hospital in February 1999, resulting in 
kidney problems and lost muscle tone.173 
In 1999, the United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) issued a report summarizing many of these data 
collection efforts and highlighting the risks associated with 
improper restraint and seclusion practices.174  The GAO also 
recognized, however, the existence of varying attitudes 
regarding the appropriateness of restraint use (including 
disagreement about whether restraints are only appropriate 
during an emergency and as a response of last resort to a 
treatment failure),175 as well as the need for restraint and 
seclusion when patients lose control and place themselves or 
others at imminent risk of physical harm,176 and the 
appropriateness of seclusion in reducing overstimulation, 
teaching self-control, and protecting others.177  The GAO 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 7-9. 
 172. Id. at 8. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 4. 
 176. Id. 
 177. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
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found that no comprehensive reporting system to track 
injuries and deaths involving the use of restraint and 
seclusion existed and that federal and state regulations 
governing restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric and 
intellectual disability settings were inconsistent across 
facility type.178  The ultimate recommendation of the GAO 
was to reduce the use of restraint and seclusion by adopting 
policies identifying permissible restraint and seclusion 
practices, reporting instances of restraint and seclusion, 
training staff regarding safe use of and alternatives to 
restraint and seclusion,179 and maintaining adequate staff-to-
patient ratios.180 
Private and governmental organizations continue to 
collect data regarding inappropriate restraint and seclusion 
practices and the dangers associated with these 
interventions.  Patients reportedly continue to be restrained 
for “trivial offenses,” such as failing to sit at a particular 
dining room table.181  Nurses apparently agree only eight 
percent of the time regarding whether a particular situation 
will escalate into violence or destruction of property and, 
thus, whether restraints or seclusion should be ordered.182  
Many restrained and secluded patients report feeling 
punished, humiliated, and de-humanized.183  A culture of 
control and force reportedly continues to pervade psychiatric 
facility management and staff, and the use of restraint and 
seclusion is believed to be evidence of the down-flow of that 
culture to patient care.184  Fifty to 150 American deaths each 
year reportedly are caused by the use of restraint and 
seclusion.185 
 
 178. Id. at 3. 
 179. Id. at 3-4. 
 180. Id. at 20. 
 181. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OVERCOMING BARRIERS AND PROTECTING 
CONSUMER RIGHTS (2003), available at 
http://alt.samhsa.gov/seclusion/SRMay5report6.htm [hereinafter OVERCOMING 
BARRIERS]. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. See id. 
 185. Id. 
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C. The Current Restraint- and Seclusion-Free Discourse 
It is not surprising that the current restraint and 
seclusion discourse focuses on the reduction and elimination 
of the use of restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric setting.  
The underlying themes of this discourse are that restraint 
and seclusion are neither positive nor therapeutic 
interventions; that restraint and seclusion are labor-intensive 
acts of violence that are less effective than alternative de-
escalation strategies; that restraint and seclusion themselves 
(and not just their inappropriate use) are the cause of 
physical and psychological injury and death; and that the use 
of restraint and seclusion is evidence that the mental health 
care system is not working correctly.186 
These themes are communicated through the literature 
of both private and governmental organizations.  In 1999, the 
National Association of State Mental Health Program 
Directors (NASMHPD) issued  a formal statement clarifying 
its position that restraint and seclusion are safety 
interventions of last resort, not treatment interventions, and 
stating its goal of reducing “and ultimately eliminating” 
restraint and seclusion use.187  The federal Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) in 
2003 formally stated its goal of “ultimately eliminating the 
use of restraint and seclusion in behavioral healthcare 
settings.”188  In 2005, SAMHSA issued as part of its National 
Action Plan a training manual designed to achieve “restraint-
free mental health care.”189  The Alliance to Prevent 
Restraint, Aversive Interventions, and Seclusion (APRAIS) 
formally stated in 2005 its vision that “children with 
disabilities should grow up “free from the use of restraint and 
seclusion . . . and from the fear that these forms of behavior 
management will be used on themselves, their siblings or 
their friends.”190  The rhetoric of restraint- and seclusion-free 
 
 186. See, e.g., id. 
 187. See POSITION STATEMENT, supra note 11. 
 188. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ROADMAP TO SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT FREE 
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 3 (2005). 
 189. See id. at 5 (“The goal of this curriculum is to provide direct care staff 
the tools and knowledge needed to improve their skills in preventing and 
ultimately eliminating the use of seclusion and restraint.”). 
 190. ALLIANCE TO PREVENT RESTRAINT, AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS, & 
SECLUSION, IN THE NAME OF TREATMENT: A PARENT’S GUIDE TO PROTECTING 
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mental health care continues today, with organizations such 
as the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health hosting training 
institutes for organizations committed to eliminating the use 
of restraint and seclusion use191 and with federal and state 
lawmakers attempting to establish restraint- and seclusion-
free psychiatric environments.192 
In summary, perspectives regarding the use of restraint 
and seclusion vary.  Searching for ways to prevent patient 
self-injury and violence to others in acute inpatient 
populations, clinicians and scientists in the mid-to-late 
twentieth century studied the efficacy of restraint and 
seclusion and concluded that these interventions had a wide 
range of accepted and appropriate uses.193  Additional studies 
conducted at the turn of the twentieth century focus less on 
the efficacy of restraint and seclusion for preventing self-
injury and violence and more on patients’ perspectives of 
their past restraint and seclusion experiences.  From this 
patient perspective, restraint and seclusion are viewed as 
psychologically harmful.  Finally, the collection and analysis 
of restraint and seclusion data in the late 1900s and early 
2000s shows that the use of restraint and seclusion can and 
has caused significant harm, including death, in child, 
adolescent, and adult psychiatric populations.  Critics of the 
latter two perspectives argue that the one hundred-plus 
 
YOUR CHILD FROM THE USE OF RESTRAINT, AVERSIVE INTERVENTIONS, AND 
SECLUSION 2 (2005). 
 191. See Hogg Found. for Mental Health, Seclusion & Restraint Reduction: 
Training Institute Instructional Materials, 
http://www.hogg.utexas.edu/programs_S&Rtraining_docs.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2007) (noting that a training institute was held in September 2006 for 
organizations committed to the ultimate elimination of restraint and seclusion 
use). 
 192. See, e.g., Child and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006, S. 
3449, 109th Cong. (2006) (introducing a federal bill that would require the 
development and dissemination of educational materials that encourage ending 
the use of restraint and seclusion in all facilities or programs that care for 
children and adolescents, as well as the training of mental health professionals 
and others on alternatives to restraint and seclusion); 104 MASS. CODE REGS. 
27.12(1) (2006) (requiring private, county, and municipal mental health 
facilities in Massachusetts to develop a plan to eliminate, wherever possible, the 
use of restraint and seclusion). 
 193. See, e.g., Binder & McCoy, supra note 129, at 1052 (“[S]eclusion is an 
accepted treatment modality on many psychiatric inpatient units . . . .”); Cotton, 
supra note 3, at 442 (discussing at length the psychiatric benefits of seclusion); 
Wadeson & Carpenter, supra note 129, at 318 (“The seclusion room is an 
important, but ambivalently perceived aspect of psychiatric inpatient units.”). 
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restraint- and seclusion-related deaths is unfortunate, but 
pales in comparison to other causes of death in the health 
care context and has been over-dramatized by the media. 
Part III thus provides a balanced review of the relevant 
medical literature and available data.  A dialogue regarding 
the criteria, if any, that justify the continued use of these 
interventions must take into account both their risks and 
benefits.  Relying on the persuasive survivor literature and 
sentinel event data, although somewhat downplaying the 
studies showing that restraint and seclusion are efficacious in 
preventing patient self-injury and violence in psychiatric 
emergencies, many mental health consumer advocacy 
organizations are lobbying to eliminate the use of restraint 
and seclusion in the psychiatric setting.  The question thus 
becomes whether legislative adoption of these elimination 
strategies will solve the restraint and seclusion controversy 
once and for all. 
IV. RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION LEGISLATION AND 
REGULATION 
A. Human Rights Principles 
To address this question, an understanding of current 
restraint and seclusion regulation is necessary.  The bulk of 
this Part focuses on federal and state law; however, it is 
important to note that restraint and seclusion are considered 
important international human rights issues as well.  During 
the last century, human rights organizations have found 
patients in international psychiatric facilities caged on their 
beds (via metal frames built two to three feet over the bed 
with a wire or net mesh enclosing the sides and the top) for 
hours and days, lying in their own urine and feces.194  At one 
facility, staff reportedly locked patients in their rooms from 
the afternoon until the next morning whenever staffing levels 
were insufficient.195  In response to these and other concerns, 
 
 194. ERIC ROSENTHAL & CLARENCE J. SUNDRAM, WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE 
ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL MENTAL HEALTH 
LEGISLATION 59 (2004); see also Oliver Lewis, Mental Disability Law in Central 
and Eastern Europe: Paper, Practice, Promise, 8 J. MENTAL HEALTH L. 293, 299 
(2002) (describing the use of caged beds in Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the 
Czech Republic, and Slovenia). 
 195. ROSENTHAL & SUNDRAM, supra note 195, at 59. 
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the United Nations General Assembly in 1991 adopted the 
“Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness 
and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care” (MI 
Principles).196  Although the MI Principles are a non-binding 
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, they are 
used as a guide to the interpretation of related provisions of 
international human rights conventions.197  Under MI 
Principles, patients in mental health facilities have the right 
to be treated in the least restrictive environment appropriate 
to the patient’s health needs and the need to protect the 
physical safety of others.198  The MI Principles also contain a 
number of procedural safeguards designed to prevent abuse.  
Practitioners working in mental health facilities must record 
each use of restraint or seclusion in the patient’s record along 
with an explanation of the clinical justification for the 
intervention.199 
B. Federal Law 
Restraint and seclusion practices are an international 
and national concern.  Following years of overcrowded, 
understaffed, dangerous, and dehumanizing conditions at 
Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama issued its 
seminal opinion in Wyatt v. Stickney.200  Among other things, 
Wyatt established three important common law principles 
relating to the use of restraint and seclusion.  First, patients 
with mental health conditions generally have the right to be 
free from restraint and seclusion.201  Second, restraint and 
seclusion may be used in an emergency situation, defined as a 
situation in which a patient might harm himself or others, 
 
 196. Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 46/119, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 49) Annex at 188-192, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991) [hereinafter MI Principles]. 
 197. Angelika C. Moncada, Comment, Involuntary Commitment and the Use 
of Seclusion and Restraint in Uruguay: A Comparison with the United Nations 
Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness, 25 U. MIAMI INTER-
AM. L. REV. 589, 593 (1994); Eric Rosenthal & Leonard S. Rubenstein, 
International Human Rights Advocacy Under the “Principles for the Protection 
of Persons with Mental Illness,” 16 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 257, 257 (1993). 
 198. MI Principles, supra note 198, at princ. 9(1). 
 199. Id. 
 200. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 201. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. at 379-80. 
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but only if less restrictive methods of preventing such harm 
are not feasible.202  Third, if a patient is to be restrained or 
secluded, a qualified mental health professional203 must have 
personally seen the episode justifying the restraint or 
seclusion, evaluated the patient, and ordered in writing the 
restraint or seclusion for no more than a short, finite period of 
time.204 
Subsequent federal decisions clarified that restraints 
may be imposed only in conjunction with treatment (in other 
words, treatment is society’s quid pro quo for the deprivation 
of personal liberty)205 and that institutional residents have a 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable restraints206 
and seclusion.207  The determination of whether a restraint is 
reasonable, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, depends on 
whether professional judgment was exercised when the 
restraint was ordered.208 
Wyatt was very influential at the national level.  Among 
other things, the opinion influenced the Task Force on Legal 
and Ethical Issues of the President’s Commission on Mental 
Health (Commission), which in turn motivated Congress’ 
enactment of the Bill of Rights section of the Mental Health 
Systems Act (MHSA) in 1980.209  The MHSA states that 
 
 202. Id. at 380. 
 203. Id. at 379 (defining a qualified mental health professional as a 
psychiatrist, a psychologist with a doctoral degree, certain social workers with 
master’s degrees and additional psychiatric clinical experience, and certain 
registered nurses with graduate degrees in psychiatric nursing and additional 
psychiatric clinical experience). 
 204. Id. at 380. 
 205. Aderholt, 503 F.2d at 1312 (citing Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507 
(5th Cir. 1974)). 
 206. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982) (quoting Greenholtz v. 
Neb. Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
 207. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1374 (D. Mass. 1979) (enjoining a 
state institution for individuals with mental illness from placing patients in 
seclusion except in emergency situations in which there is an occurrence or 
serious threat of extreme violence, personal injury, or attempted suicide), aff’d 
in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, and remanded, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 
1980), vacated by Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982). 
 208. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324 (“The State also has the unquestioned duty 
to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the 
institution.  And it may not restrain residents except when and to the extent 
professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety or to provide 
needed training.”). 
 209. RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL 
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persons receiving mental health services have the right to 
treatment in a setting and under conditions that are most 
supportive of their personal liberty and restrict such liberty 
only to the extent necessary consistent with such person’s 
treatment.210  The Commission also recommended that 
individuals have the right to be free from restraint or 
seclusion imposed for reasons other than treatment or in an 
emergency situation.211  Restraint and seclusion imposed for 
treatment or in an emergency situation, according to the 
Commission, should require the written order of a mental 
health professional.212  Congress restated these rights in 1986 
in its Bill of Rights for Mental Health Patients (Bill of 
Rights).213  Although the MHSA and the Bill of Rights 
indicate Congress’ concern regarding inappropriate use of 
restraint and seclusion, these provisions have little teeth.  
Neither the MHSA nor the Bill of Rights establishes any 
enforceable rights or duties, including a private right of 
action.214  The MHSA and the Bill of Rights are merely 
precatory; they do no more than express a Congressional 
preference for appropriate use of restraint and seclusion.215 
Although federal administrative agencies have attempted 
to impose enforceable duties relating to the use of restraint 
and seclusion on various types of health care providers, these 
efforts lacked specific applicability to the psychiatric setting 
until 1999.  The Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA)216 in 1988 adopted final regulations governing the use 
of restraint and seclusion in intermediate care facilities for 
 
AND CRIMINAL ASPECTS 1093 (4th ed. 2004). 
 210. Mental Health Systems Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9501(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (2000). 
 211. Id. § 9501(1)(F). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. § 10841. 
 214. Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 43, 47 (D. 
Mass. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 987 (1st Cir. 1992); Brooks v. Johnson & Johnson, 
Inc., 685 F. Supp. 107, 109 (E.D. Pa. 1988). 
 215. See Brooks, 685 F. Supp. at 108. 
 216. On July 1, 2001, the federal agency known as the Health Care 
Financing Administration (HCFA) became the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS).  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 2002 FACT 
SHEET:  FOR PHYSICIANS AND OTHER PROVIDERS: KEY NEWS FROM MEDICARE 
FOR 2002, at 1, available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/Transmittals/downloads/B0165.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 
2007). 
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individuals with mental retardation.217  These regulations 
restrict the use of restraints to an “integral part of an 
individual program plan that is intended to lead to less 
restrictive means of managing and eliminating the behavior 
for which the restraint is applied” and to emergency 
measures that are necessary to protect the individual or 
others from injury.218  In 1991, HCFA adopted final 
regulations governing the use of restraint and seclusion in 
nursing homes that participate in the Medicare and Medicaid 
programs.219  These regulations ban all non-medical use of 
restraint220 and all use of seclusion221 in covered nursing 
homes.  Although both sets of regulations clarify the 
appropriate use of restraint and seclusion in a range of long-
term care settings, they fail to address the use of restraint 
and seclusion in behavior management in the psychiatric 
setting.222 
As part of its ongoing revisions to its Conditions of 
Participation for Hospitals (COPs), HCFA adopted in 1999 an 
interim final rule governing the use of restraint and seclusion 
for behavior management in public and private psychiatric 
hospitals and psychiatric units in general hospitals that 
participate in the Medicare Program.223 The 1999 interim 
final rule, which was inspired in part by the Hartford 
Courant report identifying 142 restraint- and seclusion-
related deaths,224 acknowledged that in some emergency 
situations the use of restraint may be the least harmful way 
to protect an individual’s safety and the safety of others.225  
 
 217. 42 C.F.R. §§ 483.450(c)-(d) (2006).  The phrase “intellectual disability” is 
preferable to “mental retardation.”  I use “mental retardation” here to ensure 
consistency with the regulations. 
 218. Id. §§ 483.450(d)(1)(i)-(ii). 
 219. Id. §§ 483.13(a)-(b). 
 220. Id. § 483.13(a). 
 221. Id. § 483.13(b). 
 222. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 3 (“The federal government regulates the 
use of restraint and seclusion in nursing homes and Intermediate Care 
Facilities for the Mentally Retarded, but until recently, no federal regulations 
governed their use in other facilities, such as psychiatric hospitals . . . .”). 
 223. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f). 
 224. 64 Fed. Reg. 36,070, 36,070 (July 2, 1999) (codified at 42 CFR pt. 482) 
(discussing why HCFA needed to issue the patients’ rights COP); id. at 36,078 
(discussing the heightened awareness of unsafe restraint and seclusion 
practices due to media attention). 
 225. Id. at 36,078. 
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The interim final rule thus required a balancing of interests: 
[W]e believe that it is critical to reinforce appropriate 
restraints reduction by acknowledging the patient’s right 
to be free from restraints except when the use of a 
restraint is the least restrictive option that will provide 
the greatest benefit to the patient (that is, the risks 
associated with the use of the restraint are outweighed by 
the risk of not using it).226 
This balancing was formally codified in the COPs as a 
regulatory permission to use restraint227 and seclusion,228 but 
only if needed to ensure the patient’s physical safety and less 
restrictive interventions have been determined to be 
ineffective to protect the patient or others from harm.229 
In 2000, Congress enacted The Children’s Health Act 
(CHA), one section of which amended part of the Public 
Health Service Act to establish minimum requirements 
regarding the use of restraint and seclusion in health care 
facilities that receive federal funds.230  To conform the 1999 
interim final rule to the requirements set forth in the CHA, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) issued 
new restraint and seclusions regulations in December 2006.231  
Effective January 2007, the new regulations emphasize that 
patients in Medicare-participating hospitals have the right to 
be free from unnecessary restraint232 or seclusion,233 and that 
convenience, punishment, retaliation and coercion are not 
 
 226. Id. at 36,080. 
 227. The COPs define restraint as a physical restraint or a drug that is used 
as a restraint.  42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(e)(1)(i)(A)-(B).  Physical restraints include 
any manual method or physical or mechanical device, material, or equipment 
attached or adjacent to the patient’s body that the patient cannot easily remove 
that restricts the patient’s freedom of movement or bodily access.  Id. at § 
482.13(e)(1)(i)(A).  Drugs used as a restraint include medications used to control 
behavior or to restrict the patient’s freedom of movement that are not part of 
the standard treatment for the patient’s medical or psychiatric condition.  Id. at 
§ 482.13(e)(1)(i)(B). 
 228. The COPs define seclusion as the involuntary confinement of a person in 
a room or an area where the person is physically prevented from leaving.  Id. at 
§ 482.13(e)(1)(ii). 
 229. Id. at §§ 482.13(e)(2)-(3). 
 230. Children’s Health Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-310, § 3207 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 290ii (2000)). 
 231. Patients’ Rights Conditions of Participation, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,378, 71,379 
(Dec. 8, 2006) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e) (2007)). 
 232. See supra note 1 (providing the new regulatory definition of restraint). 
 233. See supra note 2 (providing the new regulatory definition of seclusion). 
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acceptable reasons to use these interventions.234  The new 
regulations contain several subtle and not-so-subtle changes 
from the 1999 interim final rule.  Like the 1999 interim final 
rule, the new regulations establish a laundry list of 
requirements that must be satisfied before restraint or 
seclusion may be imposed on a patient receiving care at a 
Medicare-participating hospital.235  First and foremost, 
restraint or seclusion only may be used when a physician or 
other licensed independent practitioner (LIP) determines that 
less restrictive interventions have been ineffective to protect 
the patient, a staff member, or others from harm.236  Unless 
superseded by a more stringent state law, “each order for 
restraint or seclusion used for the management of violent or 
self-destructive behavior that jeopardizes the immediate 
physical safety of the patient, a staff member, or others” is 
limited to four hours for adults eighteen years of age or older, 
two hours for children and adolescents nine to seventeen 
years of age, and one hour for children under nine years of 
age.237  When restraint and seclusion are used for the 
management of violent or self-destructive behavior, a 
physician, other LIP, registered nurse, or physician assistant 
with appropriate training must see the patient face-to-face 
within one hour after the intervention and must evaluate, 
among other things, the patient’s reaction to the intervention, 
the patient’s medical and behavioral condition, and the need 
to continue or terminate the intervention.238  Regardless of 
the length of time identified in the initial order, the 
practitioner must discontinue the intervention at the earliest 
possible time.239 
The new regulations strengthen the training 
requirements applicable to physicians and other LIPs who 
order restraint and seclusion.  Patients now have the right to 
safe implementation of restraint or seclusion by a trained 
staff member.240  Hospital policies must specify applicable 
 
 234. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e) (2007); Patients’ Rights Conditions of 
Participation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 71,380. 
 235. See 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e). 
 236. Id. § 482.13(e)(2). 
 237. Id. § 482.13(e)(8)(i). 
 238. Id. §§ 482.13(e)(12)(i)-(ii). 
 239. Id. § 482.13(e)(9). 
 240. Id. § 482.13(f). 
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training requirements, and physicians and LIPs must have a 
working knowledge of their hospital’s policies regarding 
restraint and seclusion.241  Staff must be able to demonstrate 
competency in the application of restraints, the 
implementation of seclusion, and the monitoring and 
assessment of patients on whom restraint and seclusion have 
been imposed as part of their initial workplace orientation 
and subsequently on a periodic basis.242  The training must 
address the use of nonphysical intervention skills, behavioral 
changes that indicate that restraint and seclusion is no longer 
necessary, and staff and patient behaviors, events, and 
environmental factors that trigger instances of restraint and 
seclusion.243 
The new regulations also impose more stringent 
reporting requirements.  Hospital must report to CMS each 
death that occurs while a patient is in restraint or seclusion, 
each death that occurs within twenty-four hours after the 
patient has been removed from restraint or seclusion, and 
each death known to the hospital that occurs within one week 
after restraint or seclusion where it is reasonable to assume 
that use of restraint or placement in seclusion contributed 
directly or indirectly to a patient’s death.244  Hospitals must 
make the required reports no later than the close of the next 
business day following knowledge of the patient’s death.245 
 In summary, the new regulations attempt to minimize 
unsafe restraint and seclusion practices by: (1) establishing 
criteria for the imposition of restraint and seclusion; (2) 
identifying the individuals who are permitted to order 
restraint and seclusion; (3) limiting the length of time for 
which restraint and seclusion may be imposed; (4) 
strengthening the training requirements applicable to health 
care professionals involved in the imposition of these 
interventions; and (5) requiring the reporting of a broader 
class of patient deaths.  The COPs do not, however, require 
Medicare-participating hospitals or psychiatric facilities to 
establish restraint- and seclusion-free environments.246 
 
 241. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(e)(11). 
 242. Id. § 482.13(f)(1). 
 243. Id. § 482.13(f)(2). 
 244. Id. § 482.13(g)(1). 
 245. Id. § 482.13(g)(2). 
 246. Hospitals, behavioral health care providers, and other health care 
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C. State Law 
States have long been interested in the regulation of 
restraint and seclusion use.  Like other state legislatures 
during the early twentieth century, the Texas Legislature 
enacted in 1925 House Bill 249 (HB 249), a then-
comprehensive piece of mental health legislation, one purpose 
of which was to regulate the restraint of state hospital 
patients who were classified as insane, mentally ill, or 
mentally defective.247  HB 249 defined restraint to include 
both “therapeutic and chemical restraint[s]” and “confinement 
in a strong room as well as seclusion in solitary confinement,” 
although it excepted from the definition “the prolonged bath, 
the hot or cold pack, or a medication when it is used as a 
remedial measure and not as a form of restraint.”248  HB 249 
restricted state hospitals from imposing restraints in the form 
of “muffs, waist straps, wristlets, anklets, camisoles, lock 
chairs, lock cribs, protection sheets or other devices 
 
organizations that have received accreditation by a national accreditation body, 
such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(JCAHO), generally are considered to be in compliance with the relevant COPs.  
See Nat’l Ass’n of Psychiatric Health Sys. v. Shalala, 120 F. Supp.2d 33, 35 
(D.D.C. 2000).  JCAHO accredits approximately eighty percent of the hospitals 
that participate in the Medicare program.  GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.  
JCAHO standards relating to restraint and seclusion are thus relevant.  
JCAHO has and enforces both hospital and behavioral health care standards.  
See JOINT COMM’N ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGS. [JCAHO], 2006 
HOSPITAL ACCREDITATION STANDARDS (2006), available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/F42AF828-7248-48C0-B4E6-
BA18E719A87C/0/06_hap_accred_stds.pdf; JCAHO, APPROVED STANDARDS 
ADDITIONS FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES (2006), available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/09CDAFFB-D502-40C7-973C-
A935DF05BC5C/0/bhc_recovery_oriented_stds.pdf.  Like the COPs, the JCAHO 
standards attempt to minimize unsafe restraint and seclusion practices by 
regulating the individuals who can order restraint and seclusion, the criteria for 
the imposition of restraint and seclusion, and the maximum length of time for 
which restraint and seclusion may be ordered, as well as establishing 
administrative and reporting requirements.  See, e.g., JCAHO, 2006 HOSPITAL 
ACCREDITATION STANDARDS, supra.  JCAHO’s revised restraint and seclusion 
standard, effective January 1, 2001, allows restraint and seclusion to be used, 
but “only in an emergency, when there is an imminent risk of an individual 
physically harming himself or herself or others, including staff.”  See JCAHO, 
SETTING THE STANDARD 8 (2007), available at 
http://www.jointcommission.org/NR/rdonlyres/6C33FEDB-BB50-4CEE-950B-
A6246DA4911E/0/setting_the_standard.pdf.  The JCAHO standards do not 
require the elimination of restraint and seclusion in the psychiatric setting. 
 247. H.B. 249, 1925 Leg., 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws 407. 
 248. Id. § 21, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 414. 
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interfering with free movement” unless the restraints were 
applied in the presence of the superintendent of the hospital, 
or of a physician, or an assistant physician employed by the 
institution, or on his written order preserved in the records of 
the institution.  In addition, the case must have involved 
“extreme violence, active, homicidal and suicidal condition, 
physical exhaustion, infectious disease or following an 
operation or acts which have caused serious bodily injury.”249  
HB 249 did carve out an emergency exception permitting the 
use of restraints without the presence of the superintendent 
or a physician and without a written order if, after the 
imposition of the restraint, the use of the restraint was 
immediately reported to the superintendent or to a physician 
who immediately investigated the case and approved or 
disapproved of the restraint imposed.250 
HB 249 further required the superintendent, physician, 
or assistant physician to personally keep under lock and key 
all implements or devices of restraint not in actual use,251 to 
document all cases of restraint use, and to make such records 
available to the governing body of mental hospitals in the 
state (the Board of Control) upon request.252  The records 
were required to include “the cause for [the restraint], the 
form used, the name of the patient, the time when the patient 
was placed under restraint and the time when released.”253  
State hospitals and employees who knowingly violated or 
willingly permitted the violation of the prohibitions against 
restraint were subject to fines of $50 to $300.254 
In the mid-twentieth century, state legislatures codified 
their various mental health laws, including their restraint 
and seclusion laws, into separate mental health codes.255  For 
example, faculty members of The University of Texas School 
of Law, with help from the Hogg Foundation for Mental 
 
 249. Id. § 19, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 413-14. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. § 20, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 414. 
 252. Id. § 21, 1925 Tex. Gen. Laws at 414. 
 253. Tex. H.B. 249. 
 254. Id. § 22. 
 255. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1740 (2005), available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mentalhealthcode_113313_7.pdf 
(pertaining to restraint); Id. § 330.1742, available at 
http://www.michigan.gov/documents/mentalhealthcode_113313_7.pdf 
(pertaining to seclusion). 
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Health and other public advocacy groups, drafted in 1957 the 
basis of Texas House Bill 6 (HB 6).  When passed by the 
Texas Legislature, HB 6 established Texas’ new Mental 
Health Code.256  One purpose of the Mental Health Code was 
to protect “the rights and liberty of every one.”  To that end, 
the Mental Health Code generally prohibited physical 
restraint use, although it did contain an exception for 
restraints that were prescribed by a physician, removed as 
soon as possible, and documented in the patient’s medical 
record under the signature of the ordering physician. 
Other states’ mental health codes similarly regulated the 
use of restraint and seclusion257 and, today, many states limit 
these interventions to “behavioral emergencies.”258 A 
behavioral emergency is defined as a situation in which 
preventive, de-escalative, or verbal techniques have been 
considered and determined to be ineffective and it is 
necessary to prevent an individual from imminent death and 
substantial bodily harm to either himself or others.259  Most 
states also expressly prohibit the use of restraint or seclusion 
as a form of discipline or punishment, for convenience, as a 
substitute for effective treatment, or to compensate for 
inadequate staffing.260  These latter provisions perhaps are a 
response to statements in mandatory annual reports drafted 
by state insane asylums during the nineteenth century261 
indicating that restraints were imposed notwithstanding the 
prevailing theory of moral treatment when an insufficient 
 
 256. Tex. Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 1, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505. 
 257. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1740. 
 258. 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 415.261 (2006). 
 259. Id. § 415.253(a)(2) (2006). 
 260. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-115(8) (2005) (“Physical restraint 
shall not be employed as punishment, for the convenience of staff, or as a 
substitute for a program of services and supports.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-
550(b)(8) (2006) (stating that each patient shall be “free from mental and 
physical abuse, corporal punishment, involuntary seclusion and any physical or 
chemical restraints imposed for purposes of discipline or convenience and not 
required to treat the patient's medical symptoms”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
394.459(4)(c) (West 2006) (“A facility may not use seclusion or restraint for 
punishment, to compensate for inadequate staffing, or for the convenience of 
staff.”). 
 261. As an example, an 1858 Texas law made it the duty of the 
superintendent of the State’s Lunatic Asylum to “keep a register of all patients 
received and discharged, and of the operations of the Asylum, . . . and report the 
general results to the Governor on the first day of October of each year.”  1858 
Tex. Gen. Laws 117, ch. 93 § 10. 
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number of attendants were responsible for supervising too 
large a number of highly excited patients.262  Many states now 
prohibit the use of restraint and seclusion to compensate for 
inadequate staffing,263 although their legislatures have not 
provided the requested appropriations that would secure an 
adequate number of trained staff members. 
For some states, regulations limiting the use of restraint 
and seclusion to behavioral emergencies were insufficient.  
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania became so concerned 
about the dangers associated with restraint and seclusion 
that a representative of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Public Welfare announced in 1997 and that restraint use 
should be eliminated altogether.264 
 
 262. One such annual report stated: 
In the thing of RESTRAINT, MECHANICAL AND CHEMICAL, one 
about as bad as the other—neither to be thought of in a properly 
organized, well conducted hospital for the insane.  All authorities upon 
the management of the insane condemn both. . . . It might be stated 
that as the quality of personal attendance improves the record will 
show a diminished amount of mechanical restraint, so that the latter 
may be regarded in some degree a gauge or measure of the former. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Although the medical officers of the Institution are as much 
opposed to mechanical restraint as any one can be, and reprobate its 
use as strongly, yet, owing to the lack of suitable attendants upon an 
excited household, have been compelled to hold recourse to it, in some 
of its most objectionable forms.  Between 50 and 60 patients, all more 
or less and not a few highly excited, in wards with their gallery 
attachments over 200 feet long, with two attendants to look after them, 
besides the ward work to do, what was to be done?  Sleeves, muffs, 
wristlets, crib-beds and other relics of barbarism in the treatment of 
the insane—“tell if not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon, 
lest the uncircumcised rejoice”—have been freely used; no help for it.  
But where there are but two attendants on such wards, the dining 
room attendant who properly keeps a dining room for fifty patients—
the china closet, knives, forks, spoons, crockery and glassware—in the 
condition they are required to be kept in this Institution, finds little 
time for ward work.  On Sundays, when one of the ward attendants has 
an off, as is the custom of all institutions of this kind, there is but one 
attendant most of the time on the ward. 
N. TEX. HOSP. FOR THE INSANE, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 12-13 (1888) (internal 
citations omitted); see also ROTHMAN, supra note 27, at 149 (“Attendants were 
too few—only one for every fifteen patients—to allow close supervision to 
obviate mechanical restraints.”). 
 263. See, e.g., supra note 263. 
 264. Susan Stefan, Successful Restraint and Seclusion Reduction Programs 
as Quality Indicators for Psychiatric Services, MEDSCAPE, Apr. 10, 2006, 
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/528949_2  (last visited Mar. 1, 2007).  
More recently, New Jersey Assemblyman Eric Munoz introduced in 2006 a bill 
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Other lawmakers appear less certain about the need to 
completely eliminate the use of restraint and seclusion in the 
psychiatric context. In February 2006, New York 
Assemblyman Peter Rivera introduced a bill that would 
loosen his state’s Mental Hygiene Law to permit certain 
physician assistants and nurse practitioners to order the 
restraint of a patient.265  South Carolina Senator Thomas 
Alexander introduced similar legislation in March 2005 that 
would amend his state’s Rights of Mental Health Patients Act 
to permit licensed independent practitioners to order 
restraint or seclusion in a mental health or alcohol and drug 
abuse facility.266 
Still other states are taking a middle position that 
supports more stringent regulation designed to reduce unsafe 
restraint and seclusion practices, while not eliminating the 
interventions altogether.  In 2005, the Texas Legislature 
clarified that mental hospitals, mental facilities, and several 
other classes of institutions may not administer a restraint 
that obstructs a patient’s airway, impairs a patient’s 
breathing, or interferes with the patient’s ability to 
communicate.267  The Texas Legislature further clarified that 
prone (face-down) or supine (face-up) holds may be used only 
for certain limited periods of time, as a last resort when other 
less restrictive interventions have proven to be ineffective, 
and when a trained observer ensures that the patient’s 
 
limiting the use of restraint and seclusion in state facilities servicing 
individuals with developmental disabilities.  H.B. 948, 2006 Leg., 212th 
Assemb. (N.J. 2006).  Outside the psychiatric and developmental disability 
context, a number of state legislatures recently have considered bills that would 
regulate the use of restraint and seclusion in public schools.  See, e.g., S.B. 906, 
2005 Gen. Assemb. Sess. (N.C. 2005); H.B. 1792, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 
2005).  Over the last ten years, Pennsylvania’s goal of restraint and seclusion 
elimination was incorporated at the federal level, including by Senator Chris 
Dodd’s Child and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006.  See Child 
and Adolescent Mental Health Resiliency Act of 2006, S. 3449, 109th Cong. 
(2006).  Introduced to Congress on June 6, 2006, Senate Bill 3449 would amend 
the Public Health Service Act to require the Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services to develop and disseminate educational materials 
that encourage eliminating the use of restraint and seclusion in all facilities or 
programs that care for children and adolescents, and to train mental health 
professionals and others on alternatives to restraint and seclusion.  Id. 
 265. A. 9986, 2006 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2006). 
 266. S. 683, 2005 Leg., 116th Sess. (S.C. 2005-2006). 
 267. S.B. 325, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2005) (codified at TEX. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 322.051(a) (Vernon 2005)). 
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breathing is not impaired.268  The legislation also charges 
Texas’ administrative agencies with adopting implementing 
regulations that define acceptable restraint holds, address the 
use of seclusion, and develop practices to decrease the 
frequency of the use of restraint and seclusion.269 
Other states continue to study the best legislative 
direction.  Connecticut, for example, introduced a bill in 2006 
that would require two state commissioners to review the 
extent to which individuals with psychiatric disabilities are 
afforded certain rights required by statute, including the 
right to restrictions on the imposition of mechanical restraint 
and seclusion.270  The commissioners are to report their 
findings and recommendations to the Connecticut General 
Assembly no later than July 1, 2007.271 
V. CONTEXTUALIZING THE RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION 
PROBLEM 
I now return to the question of whether the centuries-old 
restraint and seclusion controversy will be solved by 
legislation, as proposed by mental health consumer advocacy 
organizations, eliminating the psychiatric use of these 
interventions.  Here I argue that blanket elimination 
strategies should not be adopted without first disentangling 
more fundamental problems relating to mental health care 
access and finance. 
A. Lack of Access to and Financing for Basic Mental Health 
Care 
Studies show that the factors that contribute to the use of 
restraint and seclusion are similar to the factors that lead to 
inpatient psychiatric admission.272 These factors include 
extreme aggression, assaultive behavior, attempted suicide, 
 
 268. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 322.051(b) (Vernon 2005). 
 269. Id. § 322.052(a). 
 270. H.B. 5542, Gen. Assem., Feb. Sess. (Conn. 2006). 
 271. Id. 
 272. See Cotton, supra note 3, at 443-45; William T. Garrison, Aggressive 
Behavior Seclusion and Physical Restraint in an Inpatient Child Population, 23 
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 448, 448 (1984); Paramjit T. Joshi et al., Use of 
the Quiet Room on an Inpatient Unit, 27 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 642, 642 (1988); Paul H. Soloff, Seclusion and Restraint in 1985: A 
Review and Update, HOSP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 652, 652 (1985). 
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self-injury including cutting, and destruction of property 
using fire, feces, and other means.273 Individuals who engage 
in these behaviors frequently have pathological family 
histories, attentional and learning problems, poor self-esteem 
and impulse control, maladaptive coping strategies, and 
immature defenses.274 Socially, these individuals tend to “live 
in poverty with family histories of loss, violence, neglect, and 
abuse.”275  The therapeutic management of these individuals 
requires basic mental health care interventions that can help 
stop these maladaptive cycles and initiate healthier processes 
of adaptation and development.276 
Early detection, assessment, and linkage with mental 
health treatment and support can prevent mental health 
problems from compounding into conditions that may lead to 
restraint and seclusion.277  Early mental health interventions 
may lessen long-term conditions that breed violent and 
assaultive behavior.278  On the other hand, “untreated and 
undertreated” mental illness, especially paranoid 
schizophrenia, predisposes individuals to attempted suicide, 
homicide, and other aggressive behaviors that can lead to the 
use of restraint and seclusion.279 
All of these studies suggest that access to basic mental 
health care can help individuals avoid more serious mental 
health conditions, the symptomatic behaviors of which may 
lead to the use of restraint and seclusion.  Unfortunately, it 
goes without saying that not all Americans have access to 
basic mental health care.  Although one in five American 
children have a mental disorder,280 and between five and nine 
 
 273. See Cotton, supra note 3, at 444. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM COMM’N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING 
THE PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA 57 (2003) 
[hereinafter PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM]. 
 278. Id. at 60 (citing JACK P. SHONKOFF & DEBORAH A. PHILLIPS, FROM 
NEURONS TO NEIGHBORHOODS: THE SCIENCE OF EARLY CHILDHOOD 
DEVELOPMENT (2000)). 
 279. Sharfstein, supra note 119, at 1. 
 280. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, FAST FACTS ON INSURANCE 
COVERAGE AND ACCESS TO SERVICES FOR CHILDREN WITH SERIOUS MENTAL 
HEALTH NEEDS (2004), available at 
http://www.bazelon.org/issues/insurance/factsheets/children.pdf [hereinafter 
BAZELON] (citing U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: 
TOVINO FINAL 8/8/2007  11:12:33 AM 
2007] PSYCHIATRIC RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION 555 
percent of children have a serious emotional disturbance,281 
approximately twelve percent of American children are 
uninsured.282  Seventy-nine percent of children and 
adolescents who have mental health conditions that require 
evaluation did not receive any evaluation or mental health 
treatment in 1997.283  Twenty percent of non-elderly adults 
are uninsured, and the majority of adults with mental health 
problems also did not receive a mental health evaluation or 
treatment in the previous year.284  According to the U.S. 
Surgeon General, less than one-third of adults with a 
diagnosable mental disorder, and even a smaller proportion of 
children, receive mental health services in a given year.285  In 
summary, access to basic mental health care can help 
individuals avoid more serious conditions that may lead to 
the use of restraint and seclusion. 
Unfortunately, it goes without saying that even for those 
children and adults who are insured, mental health coverage 
is not always obtainable.286  Access to mental health care is 
restricted by private health insurance coverage limits, public 
insurance eligibility restrictions, and shortfalls in state 
budgets.287  Notwithstanding federal and state laws that 
attempted to ensure parity in mental health care coverage,288 
eighty-seven percent of health plans that complied with these 
laws place limits on mental health coverage that they do not 
place on medical or surgical care.289  Of these health plans, 
 
A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1999)). 
 281. Id. (citing PRESIDENT’S NEW FREEDOM, supra note 278). 
 282. Id. (citing KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, HEALTH 
COVERAGE IN AMERICA: 2002 DATA UPDATE (2003)). 
 283. See id. 
 284. See id. (”Adults are more likely to be uninsured than children because 
public coverage is designed primarily to help low-income children.”). 
 285. NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, A CALL FOR INVESTMENT: EXPANDING 
COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 2 (2000). 
 286. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 2 (citing Ctr. on an Aging Soc’y, 
Georgetown Univ., Issue Brief: Child & Adolescent Mental Health Services: Whose 
Responsibility is it to Ensure Care?, DATA PROFILES (2003), available at 
http://ihcrp.georgetown.edu/agingsociety/pdfs/mentalhealth.pdf). 
 287. Id. 
 288. See Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5 (2001); NAT’L 
MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, WHAT HAVE STATES DONE TO ENSURE INSURANCE 
PARITY? (2005), available at http://www1.nmha.org/state/parity/state_parity.pdf 
(summarizing state mental health parity laws). 
 289. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, No. GAO/HEHS-00-95, MENTAL 
HEALTH PARITY ACT 5 (2000), available at 
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sixty-six percent have lower outpatient office visit limits, 
sixty-five percent have lower hospital day limits, twenty-
seven percent have higher outpatient office visit co-payments, 
and twenty-five percent have higher outpatient office visit co-
insurance.290  These statistics are significant given the 
expense of mental health care.291  Just one outpatient therapy 
session can cost more than one hundred dollars, and 
residential treatment facilities that provide twenty-four-hour-
a-day, seven-day-a-week, mental health care can cost more 
than $250,000 per year.292 
Public mental health insurance coverage does not ensure 
access to all types of mental health care delivery programs.293  
Although State Child Health Insurance Program (S-CHIP) 
plans do pay for mental health care, the care that is covered 
is inpatient and outpatient care, not school-based and 
residential care.294  And, although the Early and Periodic 
Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment (EPSDT) program 
mandates the provision of all necessary medical services 
(including mental health services) to Medicaid-eligible 
children, many of these children are not receiving the 
screenings for which they are eligible.295  State budget cuts 
also may continue to reduce access to mental health care.296  
Over a recent ten-year period, expenditures for mental health 
and substance abuse decreased relative to overall healthcare 
expenditures by thirteen percent.297  State budget shortfalls 
combined with skyrocketing medical costs may cause some 
children from low-income families to lose their health care 
coverage while other children may experience a reduction in 
coverage.298 
 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00095.pdf. 
 290. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 2 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
supra note 292). 
 291. Id. at 2. 
 292. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NO.  GAO-03-397, CHILD 
WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03397.pdf). 
 293. Id. at 3. 
 294. Id. (citing Center on an Aging Society, supra note 289). 
 295. Id. 
 296. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 3 (citing Center on an Aging Society, supra 
note 289). 
 297. NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASS’N, supra note 289, at 2. 
 298. BAZELON, supra note 281, at 3 (citing Center on an Aging Society, supra 
note 289). 
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The legal system provides little assistance to individuals 
who cannot afford basic mental health care services and who 
do not have health insurance.  Americans generally do not 
have a constitutional, statutory, or common law right to 
voluntary, non-emergency mental health care.  States do not 
have a constitutional duty to provide voluntary mental health 
care services for those within its borders,299 and the failure to 
provide basic voluntary psychiatric care and treatment does 
not “shock the conscience” as would be necessary to establish 
a due process violation.300  Although Congress and many state 
legislatures have enacted mental health patient bills of rights 
that speak to mental health patients receiving the services 
they require,301 these bills generally do not establish a private 
cause of action that would support a patient’s claim for basic 
mental health care services.302  Congress, through the federal 
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), requires Medicare-participating hospitals with 
dedicated emergency departments to provide necessary 
stabilizing treatment to individuals who request emergency 
treatment; however, this requirement only applies when the 
individual is determined to have an emergency medical or 
psychiatric condition.303  A suicidal patient thus has a limited 
right under EMTALA to emergency room treatment sufficient 
to stabilize her current psychiatric emergency, but not to 
basic mental health care services that may help prevent the 
next psychiatric emergency.  The lack of access to, and 
funding for, basic mental health care contributes to 
emergency, inpatient, and acute mental health care, contexts 
 
 299. See, e.g., Monahan v. Dorchester Counseling Ctr., 770 F. Supp. 43, 46-47 
(D. Mass. 1991). 
 300. See, e.g., id. at 46 (“In essence, Plaintiff claims that the state failed to 
provide him with adequate psychiatric care and treatment . . . these 
shortcomings . . . are not so egregious as to shock the conscience . . . .” (quoting 
Pittsley v. Warish, 
927 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted)). 
 301. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 10841 (2001) (“It is the sense of the Congress that, . 
. . each State should review and revise [its laws as] necessary to ensure that 
mental health patients receive the protection and services they require . . . .”). 
 302. See, e.g., Monahan, 770 F. Supp. at 47 (“Congress did not intend to 
create a private right of action [in 42 U.S.C. § 10841].”). 
 303. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b)(1)(A) (2006) (Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act stabilization requirement); 42 C.F.R. § 489.24(a)(ii) (2006) 
(regulatory stabilization requirement). 
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in which restraints and seclusion are used more frequently.304 
Understaffing of facilities, caused by a lack of funding, 
has been one of the most persistent barriers to appropriate 
treatment, including appropriate use of restraint and 
seclusion.305  Studies routinely show that increased staff-to-
patient ratios reduce the use of restraint and seclusion.  A 
2002 study, for example, found that increases in the number 
of staff members relative to the number of patients receiving 
care at a public psychiatric hospital were significantly related 
to decreases in reliance on restraint and seclusion for 
managing challenging behavioral problems.306  Although 
federal and state laws prohibit the use of restraint and 
seclusion to compensate for inadequate staffing, this mandate 
is unfunded.  Stated another way, Congress and state 
legislatures traditionally have not appropriated the funds to 
ensure adequate staff-to-patient ratios as part of the same 
legislation prohibiting the use of restraint and seclusion as a 
substitute for adequate staffing. 
B. The Conflict Between Patient Safety and Autonomy 
Restraint and seclusion questions also implicate 
competing goals of patient safety and autonomy.307  Today, 
 
 304. See, e.g.,  U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at ch. 2 (1999), 
available at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home.html 
(lack of access to mental health care contributes to emergency and inpatient 
health care). 
 305. See, e.g., Walter E. Barton, Hospital Services for the Mentally Ill, 286 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLITICAL & SOC. SCI. 107, 113 (1953) (“Hospitals have been 
so preoccupied with problems of short staff and overcrowding that they have 
had little time to develop programs for the early recognition, diagnosis, 
treatment, and prevention of psychiatric disorders.”); Beverly Winkels, 
Seclusion Rooms and Other Restraints, NURSING, Mar. 2004, at 12, 12 (“[I]f a 
patient needs 1:1 care as a substitute for restraints, adequate staff isn’t always 
available.”). 
 306. Dennis C. Donat, Impact of Improved Staffing on Seclusion/Restraint 
Reliance in a Public Psychiatric Hospital, 25 PSYCHIATRIC REHAB. J. 413, 415 
(2002) (“This confirmed that as the staff:patient ratio gradually increased, the 
reliance on seclusion and restraint in this hospital gradually decreased.”). 
 307. See, e.g., Lorraine Cecilia Mion et al., Physical Restraint Use in the 
Hospital Setting: Unresolved Issues and Directions for Research, 74 MILBANK Q. 
411, 420 (1996) (“Clinicians typically focus on the ethical principles of 
beneficence and nonmaleficence when caring for hospitalized patients, which 
leads to a frequent medical moral dilemma: how to prevent harm to the patient 
and simultaneously preserve the patient’s autonomy.” (citing Arthur Schafer, 
Restraints and the Elderly: When Safety and Autonomy Conflict,  132 CAN. MED. 
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hospitals admit psychiatric patients almost exclusively on 
criteria designed to determine whether they are dangerous to 
themselves or others.308  Although the current restraint and 
seclusion rhetoric correctly considers the all-too-real dangers 
of restraint and seclusion, the role of these interventions in 
preventing violence and patient self-injury in psychiatric 
emergencies also must be taken into account. 
Common law requires institutional health care providers 
to protect patients against harm from themselves and others.  
In the long-term care context, the Texas Supreme Court 
recently held that a nursing home is legally required to 
prepare a comprehensive care plan for the medical and 
mental needs of its patients, and clarified that this plan may 
“require enhanced supervision and additional staff or physical 
restraints to protect them from injuring themselves and 
others or to protect them from other patients.”309  This case 
builds on the common law principle that hospitals, including 
hospitals treating patients with mental health conditions, 
have a duty to prevent patients from harming themselves and 
others, and that this duty may include the imposition of 
restraints: “The hospital’s responsibility to its patient 
extended to the taking of such measures as were necessary to 
 
ASS’N J. 2157 (1985), available at 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/picrender.fcgi?artid=1346330&blobtype=pdf)
); A. Sourander et al., Use of Holding, Restraints, Seclusion and Time-out in Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatric In-Patient Treatment, 11 EUR. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 162. 162 (2002) (“[T]he use of restraints . . . poses a conflict between a 
patient’s clinical needs and legal rights.”); Thomas S. Szasz, Hospital Refusal to 
Release a Mental Patient, 9 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 220, 220 (1960) (“The 
double role of the institutional psychiatrist—consisting on the one hand of being 
a therapist to his patient, and on the other of being a protector of society against 
the patient—is one of the major dilemmas facing contemporary psychiatry.”); 
Tardiff, supra note 132, at 614 (“In an age of concern about the rights and 
freedom of the individual, the use of coercive measures of control in psychiatric 
hospitals has come under intense scrutiny by the legal and medical 
professions.”); Taxis, supra note 3, at 158 (“[N]urses [and other staff members] 
are clearly responsible for the safety of patients, [but codes of ethics such as] the 
American Nurses Association . . . also require[] that the nurse provide care that 
is respectful of the dignity and individuality of each patient. . . . An ethical 
quagmire often arises when the nurse, faced with a decision to restrain or 
seclude a patient, must balance factors of autonomy, beneficence, and 
nonmaleficence with therapeutic goals.” (citing BANDMAN & BANDMAN, supra 
note 3; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3)). 
 308. Sharfstein, supra note 119, at 1. 
 309. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 850 (Tex. 
2005). 
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prevent the patient from hurting himself if the hospital knew 
or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that 
the patient’s mental incapacity might lead to his own 
injury.”310 
Many times, however, a health care provider’s common 
law duty to prevent violent and assaultive patients from 
harming themselves and others will conflict with the 
provider’s ethical and legal duty to promote patient 
autonomy.  The word “autonomy” derives from the Greek 
autos (“self”) and nomos (“rule,” “governance,” or “law”).311  
Although the word autonomy traditionally referred to the 
self-rule of independent city-states, bioethicists, lawyers, and 
others since have extended the word to refer to the related 
concepts of personal liberty, self-governance, and individual 
choice.312  An autonomous individual self-rules and is free 
from controlling interference by others.313  An individual who 
has diminished autonomy, on the other hand, may be 
controlled by others or may be incapable of deliberating about 
or acting upon her personal desires and goals.314  Individuals 
who are incarcerated in jails and individuals who have 
intellectual disabilities that interfere with decision-making 
capacity frequently are referred to as having diminished 
autonomy.315  Physically and chemically restrained and 
secluded patients who lack freedom of movement and the 
ability to control their behavior also have diminished 
autonomy.316 
In situations in which a health care provider has 
attempted to, but cannot, calm a violent patient using less 
restrictive de-escalation techniques, and where the provider 
reasonably believes that significant patient self-injury or 
death, or injury to or the death of a third-party is imminent, 
the health care provider may restrain or seclude the patient 
 
 310. Harris v. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 557 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Tex. Civ. 
App.-1st 1977). 
 311. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 57. 
 312. Id. at 57-58. 
 313. Id. at 58. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
 316. See id. (“Even autonomous persons with self-governing capacities 
sometimes fail to govern themselves in particular choices because of temporary 
restraints caused by illness or depression . . . or other conditions that restrict 
their options.”). 
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as a means of preventing violence.317  In these situations, the 
intervention appears to be consistent with the provider’s 
common law duty to prevent patients from injuring 
themselves and others.  By ordering the intervention, the 
provider also, however, has diminished the autonomy of the 
restrained or secluded patient.318 
The question becomes how a provider’s common law duty 
to prevent patient self-injury and harm to others should be 
balanced with the duty to promote patient autonomy in a 
psychiatric emergency.  Those in favor of policies that would 
eliminate the use of psychiatric restraint and seclusion weigh 
the patient’s right to autonomy more heavily than the 
provider’s duty to prevent patient self-injury and harm to 
others.319  Indeed, the patient’s right to autonomy (to the 
exclusion of patient and community safety) tends to be 
featured prominently in the materials of many psychiatric 
patient advocacy organizations: “Seclusion and restraint 
procedures . . . represent a significant infringement of an 
individual’s right to autonomy and self-determination . . . .”320  
Positions such as these are not surprising considering the 
high value our culture places on individual autonomy.321 
Unfortunately, reductions in the use of restraint and 
seclusion also have been associated with injury to or the 
death of the violent patient, another patient, an employee, or 
a third party.322  And this potential for injury or death cannot 
be ignored.  Recent studies show that approximately eighteen 
to twenty-five percent of psychiatric inpatients exhibit violent 
behavior while in the hospital.323  Approximately seventy-
 
 317. Sharfstein, supra note 119, at 1 (“At times, it is necessary to restrain or 
isolate individuals to prevent them from harming themselves or others.”). 
 318. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 3, at 58 (“Personal autonomy 
is . . . self-rule that is free from both controlling interference by others and from 
limitations.”). 
 319. PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT ADVOCATE OFFICE, REVIEW OF SECLUSION AND 
RESTRAINT PRACTICES IN ONTARIO PROVINCIAL PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITALS: 
PERSPECTIVES OF PATIENTS, CLINICIANS, AND ADVOCATES 3 (2001). 
 320.  Id. 
 321. See, e.g., DANIEL B. SINCLAIR, JEWISH BIOMEDICAL LAW: LEGAL AND 
EXTRA-LEGAL DIMENSIONS 174 (2003) (“In modern common-law systems, the 
concept of autonomy is at the centre of the physician-patient relationship, and 
constitutes a value to which the courts attempt to give as full expression as 
possible.”); Schafer, supra note 308, at 1258. 
 322. Note, supra note 64, at 156. 
 323. Michele Raja & Antonella Azzoni, Hostility and Violence of Acute 
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eight percent of violent acts committed by psychiatric 
inpatients are directed toward “nurses, with other targets 
being (in descending order of frequency) fellow patients, 
property, [the patient himself or herself], physicians, 
psychologists, family members, and housekeeping staff.”324  
“Ten to 45% of patients with schizophrenia exhibit aggressive 
or threatening behavior during hospitalization.”325  
Approximately ten percent of individuals diagnosed with 
schizophrenia commit suicide,326 many during young 
adulthood, and some of these young adults make suicide 
attempts shortly before and even during psychiatric 
admissions.327  Although physicians and other mental health 
care providers sometimes can predict which  threats will turn 
to actual violence based on diagnosis, the patient’s current 
behavior, the patient’s previous history, and the provider’s 
previous experience with the patient, the unpredictability of 
mental illness and its various manifestations prevents 
 
Psychiatric Inpatients, 1 CLINICAL PRAC. & EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MENTAL HEALTH 
1, 1 (2005) (citing C. Arango et al., Violence in In-Patients with Schizophrenia: A 
Prospective Study, 25 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 493 (1999); McNeil et al., 
Predictors of Violence in Civilly Committed Acute Psychiatric Patients, 145 AM. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 965 (1988)). 
 324. Id.; see also Richard A. Friedman, Violence and Mental Illness: How 
Strong is the Link?, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2064, 2064 (2006) (discussing the 
death of Wayne Fenton, associate director of the National Institute for Mental 
Health, who was killed by a violent patient with schizophrenia on September 3, 
2006). 
 325. Raja & Azzoni, supra note 324, at 1 (citing T. Craig, An Epidemiological 
Study of Problems Associated with Violence Among Psychiatric Problems, 139 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1262 (1982); M. Rossi et al., Violent or Fear-Inducing 
Behavior Associated with Hospital Admission, 36 HOSP. COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 643 (1985); K. Tardiff et al., Violence by Patients Admitted to a 
Private Psychiatric, 154 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 88 (1997); K. Tardiff & A. Sweillam, 
Assault, Suicide, and Mental Illness,  37 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 164 
(1980)); see also Friedman, supra note 325, at 2065 (providing additional 
statistics regarding assaultive patients). 
 326. Alan Breier, Introduction: A New Era in the Pharmacotherapy of 
Psychotic Disorders, 62 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 3, 3 (2001) (citing Alan Breier 
& B.M. Astrachan, Characterization of Schizophrenic Patients Who Commit 
Suicide, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 206 (1984)). 
 327. See, e.g., S. Cohen et al., Rates and Correlates of Suicide Attempts in 
First-Admission Psychotic Patients, 90 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 167 
(1994) (documenting patient suicide attempts during the episode for which they 
were hospitalized); H. Spie l et al., Suicidal Behavior of Psychiatric In-Patients, 
106 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 134 (2002) (examining suicidal behavior 
before and during psychiatric inpatient stays). 
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providers from accurately identifying all violent patients.328 
I do not believe that ethical interpretations or laws that 
would completely eliminate restraint and seclusion as an 
option are supportable in this context.  By “this context,” I 
mean a situation in which: (1) all patients do not have access 
to basic mental health care; (2) a lack of access to and funding 
for such care contributes to the use of emergency, inpatient, 
and acute mental health care; (3) a mental health care 
provider working in this environment reasonably believes 
that a psychiatric patient may seriously injure or kill him or 
herself or another person; and (4) less restrictive de-
escalation measures have been tried and have proven 
ineffective.  Instead, the violent patient’s right to autonomy 
must be balanced against the interest in maintaining the life 
and safety of the patient and third parties.  A policy that 
would eliminate the use of restraint and seclusion as an 
option in this context would focus too narrowly on the 
question of whether the violent patient’s liberty interest has 
been infringed.  Instead, the question should be whether the 
nature or extent of the liberty violation is reasonable in light 
of the imminent threat to health or safety.329 
 
 328. Note, supra note 70, at 162. 
 329. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-24 (1982).  In Youngberg, 
the Court said: 
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests in safety and 
freedom from bodily restraint.  Yet these interests are not absolute . . . . 
In operating an institution such as Pennhurst, there are occasions in 
which it is necessary for the State to restrain the movement of 
residents—for example, to protect them as well as others from violence. 
. . . The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has been 
infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of 
absolute safety is such as to violate due process. . . .  In determining 
what is “reasonable”—in this and in any case presenting a claim for 
training by a State—we emphasize that courts must show deference to 
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 
Id. at 319-20, 322.  Since Youngberg, many courts have applied the professional 
judgment standard to restraint and seclusion cases.  See, e.g., Heidemann v. 
Rother, 84 F.3d 1021, 1029-31 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff’s evidence was 
“insufficient to create a genuine dispute as to whether the blanket wrapping 
treatment represented a substantial departure from accepted professional 
judgment, practice, or standards”); Subacz v. Sellars, No. CIV.A.96-CV-6411, 
1998 WL 720822, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 1998) (two physicians’ reports 
could be a basis for finding that professional judgment was not exercised in the 
use of bodily restraints); United States v. Pennsylvania, 902 F. Supp. 565, 631-
40 (W.D. Pa. 1995) (finding the institutional defendant had exercised 
professional judgment in attempting to treat residents’ behavior problems). 
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In light of the significant dangers of restraint and 
seclusion, I think that the restraint and seclusion-free 
movement has important and laudable goals. However, 
lawmakers need to consider a more balanced and complete 
dialogue regarding the root causes of violence and aggression 
before adopting policies that would completely prohibit the 
use of restraint and seclusion.  Attempts to eliminate factors 
within the mental health care system that contribute to 
mental health conditions that manifest in violence and 
aggression should precede, or at least accompany, attempts to 
eliminate the use of restraint and seclusion. 
C. A Note About Legalism Versus Medicalism 
Before discussing my approach to the restraint and 
seclusion controversy, I would like to suggest a final reason 
for the persistence of the controversy, which relates to 
legalism and medicalism.  One theme in the psychiatry and 
the law literature is legalism versus anti-legalism, or 
medicalism.  This theme views the reform of mental health 
legislation and its history in terms of a pendulous movement 
between the two extremes of stringent mental health 
regulation, on the one hand, and unchecked medical 
discretion on the other.330  The legalism versus medicalism 
theme is a useful tool for exploring opposing attitudes 
towards the use of restraint and seclusion. 
The philosophical doctrine of legalism has been equated 
with formalism (a mechanistic approach) that many believe is 
too rigid to regulate the unpredictable field of psychiatry.331  
According to the doctrine of legalism, moral conduct is “a 
matter of rule following rather than individual conscience.”332  
Legalism also suggests rigid adherence to the form of the law, 
rather than its spirit or intended purpose.333  However 
defined, one frequent criticism of legalism when applied to 
the field of psychiatry is that psychiatric decision-making is 
better left to professional ethics, not stringent regulation.  
Legalism also has been blamed for attempting to limit 
 
 330. Phil Fennell, Law and Psychiatry: The Legal Constitution of the 
Psychiatric System, 13 J.L. SOC’Y 35, 37-38 (1986). 
 331. Id. (citing K. Jones, The Limitations of the Legal Approach to Mental 
Health, 3 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 10, 10-11 (1980)). 
 332. Id. at 38. 
 333. Id. 
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medical discretion by enhancing patients’ rights.334 
Anti-legalism, or medicalism, focuses on freeing of 
psychiatry from excess regulation.335  Medicalism highly 
values the independent medical judgment of psychiatrists and 
other mental health professionals, and encourages 
professionals to make decisions that will minimize harmful 
physical effects.336  Proponents of medicalism value 
compassion and a desire to protect patients from harm.337  As 
expected, opponents view the medical model as paternalistic 
and outdated.338 
Viewed through the lens of legalism versus medicalism, 
the controversy surrounding psychiatric restraint and 
seclusion use is better understood.  The goal of many 
psychiatric patient consumer advocates is to reduce the use of 
restraint and seclusion because their use has caused 
psychological harm, serious physical injury, and even 
death.339  One option for meeting this goal is to establish, by 
means of statute or regulation, the right of mental health 
patients to be free from dangerous holds and psychologically 
harmful isolation practices.340  Because of the difficulty of 
distinguishing between safe and unsafe methods of restraint 
and seclusion, as well as the administrative and judicial 
oversight needed to determine which ordering physicians 
were behaving carefully or dangerously vis-à-vis these 
interventions, consumer advocates instead decide to support a 
formal and absolute right of patients to be free from all 
restraints and seclusion.341  Mental health care providers who 
use alternative de-escalation strategies are viewed as 
complying with the law, whereas providers who use restraint 
and seclusion are viewed as violating human rights. 
The goal of many mental health care professionals also is 
to prevent psychological harm, physical injury, and death.  
Mental health care professionals use their education and 
clinical training to weigh factors such as diagnosis, current 
 
 334. See id. at 39-40. 
 335. Id. at 37. 
 336. Schafer, supra note 308, at 1257. 
 337. Id. 
 338. See id. 
 339. See supra Parts III.B-C. 
 340. See supra Parts IV.B-C. 
 341. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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behavior, and past experience with the patient to determine, 
when all less restrictive measures have been tried and have 
failed, whether to restrain or seclude the patient.342 Although 
formal rules permitting or prohibiting restraint and seclusion 
are nice, they are not altogether useful in balancing the 
interests of the psychiatric patient and third parties when the 
unpredictable behavior of a patient is at issue.  A medicalist 
might view the psychiatrist’s application of professional 
judgment to the emergency situation as an act of compassion 
and a desire to protect patients and third parties from harm; 
a legalist, however, might interpret the decision to order 
restraint or seclusion as controlling and demeaning.343 
Although mental health consumer advocates and the 
medical profession both have patient health as their goal, 
they differ regarding the best means of accomplishing it.  The 
momentum of the current non-restraint movement shows the 
value our culture places on autonomy and reminds us of our 
mandate to respect and promote the rights of individuals with 
disabilities, including individuals with mental illness.344  But 
I worry that the realities of our mental health care system 
(including a lack of access to basic mental health care, which 
contributes to the need for emergency, inpatient, and acute 
mental health care, the necessity of which is determined 
based on criteria including the dangerousness of the patient 
to self and others) have not yet caught up with the goals of 
the non-restraint movement.  When a physician or other 
licensed independent practitioner reasonably believes that a 
patient’s behavior poses an imminent threat to the life or 
health of the patient or a third party and all less restrictive 
measures have proven ineffective, the option to use restraint 
or seclusion should be preserved. 
D. Future Restraint and Seclusion Policy 
Existing federal and state laws governing psychiatric 
restraint and seclusion regulate the individuals who can 
order restraint and seclusion, the length of time for which 
restraint and seclusion may be ordered, the criteria for the 
imposition of restraint and seclusion, the use of restraint and 
 
 342. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 343. Schafer, supra note 308, at 1257. 
 344. See supra Part V.B. 
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seclusion to compensate for inadequate staffing, the 
education of health care professionals regarding the dangers 
of restraint and seclusion, and the reporting of adverse events 
that occur during or as a result of these interventions.345  So, 
what should be the direction of future restraint and seclusion 
policy? 
Our health care policy must address the root causes of 
the use of restraint and seclusion.  The studies discussed in 
Part V.A suggest that we can reduce the incidence of the 
violent and aggressive behavior that traditionally has 
preceded the use of restraint and seclusion by providing 
earlier intervention and care for individuals with mental 
illness.  The studies discussed in Part V.B further suggest 
that higher staff-to-patient ratios can reduce the use of 
restraint and seclusion.346  Additional studies suggest that 
more detailed patient assessments at the time of admission 
may increase health care providers’ ability to identify those 
patients who may resort to violence and those who will not, 
thus reducing unnecessary use of restraint and seclusion.347  
Of course, earlier intervention and care for individuals with 
mental illness, higher staff to patient ratios, and more 
detailed violence screening require more time and human 
resources and greater funding of mental health care.  In a 
perfect world with limitless funds, our health care policy 
would appropriate more funds for basic mental health care, 
increased staffing of emergency and inpatient mental health 
care, and more detailed inpatient assessments.  Such a policy 
would prospectively minimize the factors that actually give 
rise to psychiatric violence and aggression, instead of 
responding to violence and aggression that already has 
occurred or is about to occur. 
In an imperfect world in which additional funding for 
basic mental health care and increased staffing of emergency 
and inpatient psychiatric units is not forthcoming, our health 
care policy should continue to require the use of alternative 
 
 345. See supra Parts III.B-C. 
 346. Donat, supra note 307, at 415 (“This confirmed that as the staff:patient 
ratio gradually increased, the reliance on seclusion and restraint in this 
hospital gradually decreased.”). 
 347. See, e.g., Dale E. McNiel & Renee L. Binder, Screening for Risk of 
Inpatient Violence: Validation of an Actuarial Tool, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579, 
580 (1994). 
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de-escalation strategies if the benefits of these strategies 
outweigh the physical and psychological risks to the patient 
and third parties from restraint and seclusion.  Laws and 
regulations should continue to require health care providers 
to incorporate the least restrictive techniques into their de-
escalation strategies, thereby limiting the use of restraint and 
seclusion to extreme situations involving imminent violence 
that are unresponsive to alternative de-escalation strategies.  
In these extreme situations, our laws and regulations should 
continue to permit the use of restraint and seclusion on the 
grounds that the life of the patient and third parties 
outweighs the liberty interference and physical and 
psychological injuries that may result from restraint and 
seclusion use. 
Our current laws do not, however, provide specific 
guidance regarding safe methods of restraint and seclusion.  
For example, the Conditions of Participation require 
Medicare-participating hospitals to implement restraint and 
seclusion in the least restrictive manner possible and in 
accordance with safe appropriate restraining techniques.348  
However, neither the Conditions of Participation nor any 
guidance adopted thereunder specify the relative safety of 
various methods of restraint and seclusion.  To ensure that 
health care providers are using only the safest methods of 
restraint and seclusion, a Congressional committee, a federal 
agency or subagency such as SAMHSA, or the Government 
Accountability Office could research, identify, and publish as 
guidance the safest methods of restraint and seclusion.  
Depending on the research findings, the guidance may, for 
example, prohibit health care providers from administering 
restraints (identified in the guidance by name and picture) 
that obstruct a patient’s airway, impair a patient’s breathing, 
or interfere with a patient’s ability to communicate.  The 
guidance may permit health care providers to use prone and 
supine holds only as a transition to another hold and only 
when an observer who has been trained to identify the risks 
associated with positional, compression, or restraint 
asphyxiation and with prone and supine holds, and who is not 
involved in the restraint, is ensuring that the patient’s 
 
 348. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f) (2007). 
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breathing is not impaired.349 
Although many laws, including the COPs, establish 
maximum time limits for which restraint and seclusion may 
be imposed, and require the continual assessment, 
monitoring, and reevaluation of restrained or secluded 
patients,350 neither the COPs nor any guidance adopted 
thereunder specify exactly how restrained or secluded 
patients should be monitored.  Because JCAHO data shows 
that one of the most significant risks to individuals who are 
restrained is suffocation, our health care policy should 
consider requiring the use of pulse oximetry during episodes 
of restraint.351  Pulse oximetry is a noninvasive direct 
measure of the oxygen saturation of hemoglobin.352  Modern, 
portable oximeters are considered accurate and reliable.353  
More importantly, recent studies conclude that oximetry may 
be a “viable, cost-effective tool that could protect persons who 
are subjected to physical restraint from respiratory 
embarrassment, suffocation, and death”354 by alerting health 
care professionals to situations in which an individual’s 
oxygen is dangerously low. 
Although many laws, including the COPs, permit 
restraint or seclusion to be used only when “less restrictive 
measures have been found to be ineffective to protect the 
patients or others from harm,”355  and require all staff who 
have direct patient contact to have ongoing education and 
training in “alternative methods for handling behavior, 
symptoms, and situations that traditionally have been 
treated through the use of restraints or seclusion,”356 neither 
the COPs nor any guidance adopted thereunder specify the 
least restrictive alternatives to restraint and seclusion nor do 
they rate the relative effectiveness of alternative, named de-
 
 349. Recent Texas legislation may be helpful in this regard.  See TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 322.052 (Vernon 2006). 
 350. 42 C.F.R. §§ 482.13(f)(3)(ii)(D), (f)(5). 
 351. See, e.g., Masters, supra note 120, at 18; Kim James Masters & Deborah 
Wandless, Use of Pulse Oximetry During Restraint Episodes, 56 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 1313, 1313 (2005). 
 352. Masters & Wandless, supra note 352, at 1313. 
 353. Id. (citing R.R. Reeves & M.E. Ladner, Screening for Decreased Oxygen 
Saturation During Medical Evaluations, 56 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 108 (2005)). 
 354. Masters & Wandless, supra note 352, at 1313. 
 355. 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(f)(3)(i). 
 356. Id. § 482.13(f)(6). 
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escalation strategies.  Federal and state legislatures and 
administrative agencies may wish to take notice of the 
existence of alternative distraction aids, including virtual 
reality techniques, that are being considered by behavioral 
psychologists who study the effectiveness of de-escalation 
strategies.357  Given JCAHO’s finding that seclusion is twenty 
times safer than restraint, lawmakers also may wish to 
consider the effectiveness of prioritizing seclusion in the 
intervention sequence.358 
Finally, the survivor studies discussed in Part III show 
that even “safe” restraint and seclusion practices can cause 
psychological harm.  Additional literature written by patients 
who have been restrained or secluded further detail the 
liberty interferences and negative psychological effects, 
including embarrassment, humiliation, and dehumanization, 
that can result from the use of restraint and seclusion.359  
Even though our laws permit the use of restraint and 
seclusion on the grounds that these interventions may save 
the life of the patient or third parties in a psychiatric 
emergency that is non-responsive to alternative de-escalation 
strategies, our mental health care providers should recognize 
the significant liberty interference and the potential for 
negative psychological effects and incorporate measures to 
counteract these injuries into the patient’s treatment plan.  
The impact of restraint and seclusion on psychiatric patients 
should be “acknowledged and addressed therapeutically.”360 
For centuries, restraint and seclusion have been overused 
as methods of psychiatric behavior management.  
 
 357. See, e.g., Masters, supra note 120, at 19. 
 358. See id. at 20. 
 359. STEPHANIE HAIMOWITZ ET AL., RESTRAINT AND SECLUSION – A RISK 
MANAGEMENT GUIDE 11 (Sept. 2006), available at 
http://www.power2u.org/downloads/R-
S%20Risk%20Manag%20Guide%20Oct%2006.pdf (noting that restraint and 
seclusion can be humiliating); OHIO LEGAL RIGHTS SERV., A CLOSER LOOK: 
SECLUSION AND RESTRAINT PRACTICES IN CHILDREN’S RESIDENTIAL FACILITIES 
IN OHIO (Apr. 2002), available at 
http://www.olrs.ohio.gov/asp/pub_3_PhysicalRestraint.asp (noting that it is 
embarrassing to be restrained and secluded); Lisa W. Foderaro, Hospitals Seek 
an Alternative to Straitjacket, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at A1 (noting that 
physical restraints can be dehumanizing). 
 360. OVERCOMING BARRIERS, supra note 182 (“The impact of abuse and 
trauma on the lives of consumers and staff must be acknowledged and 
addressed therapeutically.”). 
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Acknowledgement of both the physical and psychological 
dangers of restraint and seclusion as well as the realities of 
our modern mental health care system may take us to the 
next step in the restraint and seclusion controversy. 
 
 
